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Introduction and overview
Max Mendez-Parra, Overseas Development Institute 
Dirk Willem te Velde, Overseas Development Institute 
L Alan Winters, UK Trade Policy Observatory, University of Sussex
Introduction 
Following the vote to leave the EU on 23 June 2016, the 
UK is facing one of its most formidable policy challenges. A 
new trade policy will have to be designed to address its new 
strategic interests. Considering the different and frequently 
opposing interests, this task is far from straightforward. 
At the same time, the UK is presented with a unique 
opportunity to redefine policy objectives and design new 
tools to implement them.
Many of Brexit’s supporters have argued for a need 
to redefine the role of the UK in international politics, 
with trade at the centre. From the use of international 
development assistance to the negotiation of trade 
agreements, trade is regarded as the basis on which to 
pursue national interests as well as retain global leadership.
Unfortunately, little attention has focused on how a 
new UK trade policy could contribute to development. 
This is surprising considering that much of the UK’s global 
leadership is derived from its relationships with developing 
countries, and the cross-party consensus in the UK on the 
importance of global development. The UK has been a 
major advocate of using the EU’s trade policy to deliver 
development, and has devoted a significant share of its aid 
to helping developing countries increase and diversify their 
trade. 
The potential to define a new trade strategy, agree new 
trade agreements and use new aid and trade tools constitutes 
a major opportunity for the UK to continue championing 
the cause of trade and development. It is also an opportunity 
for the UK to make trade policy work more effectively and 
efficiently in delivering development opportunities. 
At the same time, there are significant concerns over 
whether the UK is willing and able to assume such a role. 
The challenge of defining a new trade policy is considerable, 
and one for which the UK Government appears ill-prepared. 
Given the magnitude of the tasks and the number of 
negotiations that the UK will face in the next few years, 
there is a major risk that developing countries will be 
overlooked.
This collection of essays offers a number of perspectives 
on how a new UK trade policy towards developing countries 
and regions could be designed and implemented, in both 
the short and longer term. It also conveys the concerns, 
opportunities and expectations from a group of leading 
trade specialists from academia, international organisations 
and think tanks in the UK and elsewhere.
Summary of essays
The essays and this introduction are structured into five 
sections: 
1. Principles for a new UK trade policy and the 
relationship with developing countries 
2. The potential effects of a new UK trade policy on 
developing countries: some scenarios
3. The value of preferential access to the UK market for 
developing countries
4. A new UK trade policy: opportunities beyond tariffs
5. Regional perspectives on a new UK trade policy
Following this introduction, we provide a summary of 
the essays. The next section then draws out some major 
commonalities and differences amongst the essays. This 
introduction and overview concludes with key messages 
and suggestions for UK policy makers faced with the task of 
designing the UK’s new trade policy and trading relationship 
with developing countries and emerging economies. 
1. Principles for a new UK trade policy and the 
relationship with developing countries
L. Alan Winters discusses the principles that should 
underpin the new UK trade policy towards developing 
countries. He stresses the importance of recognising the 
heterogeneity among developing countries and calls for a 
simple, pragmatic approach, which includes the definition 
of a simple preferential regime with forgiving rules of 
origin. However, he argues that policy must be made while 
recognising that, as a small player, the UK may lose direct 
influence over policies in developing countries.  
Adrian Wood discusses the internal challenges that the 
UK will face in defining its trade policy towards developing 
countries. Development assistance is unpopular among 
many supporters of Brexit and there will be pressure to 
impose trade restrictions. Advocates of development will 
therefore need to maximise the developmental benefits of 
trade policies in a context of limited resources and major 
scrutiny from certain groups. Wood recommends focusing 
on a limited number of valuable dimensions and not trying 
to do everything at the same time.
Sheila Page analyses the priorities and objectives for 
developing countries. Due to the uncertainty over the 
evolution of a new UK trade policy, it will be hard for 
these countries to assess what they want and can get 
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out of negotiations with the UK. Moreover, developing 
countries will have little say in the negotiations between 
the EU and UK on issues such as the funding of the 
European Development Fund. Page concludes that, for 
now, developing countries should prioritise defending their 
interests in trade relationships with the EU and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).
2. The potential effects of a new UK trade policy on 
developing countries
EU–UK negotiations will play a major role in defining 
the new UK trade policy. Dirk Willem te Velde identifies 
a number of scenarios for relationships with developing 
countries depending on the stance the UK adopts towards 
trade and the nature of the agreement reached with the EU. 
Much is at stake for developing countries if the UK does 
not form part of a customs union with the EU and instead 
decides to offer and negotiate trade tariffs. If the UK were 
to reduce margins of preference for developing countries, 
for example, this will increase the duties paid by those 
countries dependent on such preferences. The value of 
concluding free trade agreements (FTAs) between the UK 
and major emerging markets (to which the EU does not 
already have duty-free access) in terms of lower duties paid 
on UK exports could amount to $7.3 billion.
Jim Rollo also discusses different scenarios for the EU–
UK negotiations and how they might affect the relationship 
with developing countries. He stresses that there is room 
to improve the arrangements that will be ‘inherited’ from 
the EU, but also notes the damage that uncertainty over the 
timing and content of the future UK trade policy is causing 
in developing countries.   
3. The value of preferential access to the UK market 
for developing countries
The issue of preferences is an important feature of many of 
the contributions. Simon Evenett highlights the problems 
of basing UK trade policy towards developing countries 
exclusively on preferences and FTAs. He suggests a move 
away from preferences towards a regime of uniformly low 
tariffs. However, there is potential for additional policy 
towards specific countries to lower trade costs using Aid 
for Trade (AfT). 
Emily Jones highlights the importance of securing 
duty-free, quota-free access for Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) to the UK. She highlights that the UK may need to 
devise its own unilateral preferences and replace the existing 
FTAs it has with the EU. As these new arrangements may 
take time, however, a waiver at the WTO must be requested 
as soon as the UK recovers its negotiation rights. 
Urgent steps are needed to keep markets open for 
developing countries. Barbara Crowther, Liz May and Matt 
Grady highlight the importance of enhancing preferential 
regimes for LDCs and selected non-LDC developing 
countries, by allowing the maximum cumulation possible 
in rules of origin to allow more goods to meet the relevant 
rules. They argue that the effects on the poorest countries 
should be included in analyses of FTAs with third countries, 
and call for a review of the UK’s bilateral investment 
treaties and the inclusion of commitments on labour, 
human rights and the environment. 
Christopher Stevens and Jane Kennan examine the 
potential effects on Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) of the UK’s exit from the EU. They find that in 
general, very little changes in the cost–benefit analysis 
of EPAs for many African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
signatories. The importance of the UK for exports of 
certain sensitive products from the Caribbean, however, 
may compel some countries to seek to revise their 
agreements with the EU if the UK is no longer party to 
their EPAs. 
Jane Kennan also discusses the effect of the potential 
change in market access resulting from Brexit on exports 
to the UK. She finds that non-LDC ACP countries may 
have to pay additional duties on their exports to the UK 
and estimates the effect of not granting preferences to these 
countries to be €205 million. 
4. A new UK trade policy: opportunities beyond tariffs
Trade policy today goes well beyond tariffs. It includes 
provisions on services, investment, rules of origin, anti-
dumping, AfT and other issues. Stephen Gelb points out 
that investment and trade policy are increasingly hard to 
separate. After Brexit, the UK will need to define a new 
investment policy. This presents an opportunity to consider 
the development impact of investments in the context 
of global value chains and to create a more open and 
transparent dispute settlement mechanism.
There are certain other technical aspects with major 
effects on developing countries that need to be considered. 
Peter Holmes looks beyond tariffs to analyse the 
implications for developing countries of anti-dumping and 
trade-related standards. He also discusses how membership 
of the European Economic Association (EEA) would not 
grant the UK the same level of access to the Single Market 
as membership of the EU currently does. Access for 
developing countries to a UK that is part of the EEA will 
not necessarily translate into access to the EU. 
Jodie Keane focuses on services, a key UK sector 
and one that is also of increasing importance in many 
developing countries. The EU’s EPA with the Caribbean 
Forum (CARIFORUM) is the only comprehensive 
agreement in place that covers services, investment and 
e-commerce, and is more ambitious on services than the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services. It can therefore 
provide a benchmark against which to measure any future 
agreements. However, Keane also discusses the data 
limitations that make such assessments challenging. 
Max Mendez-Parra and Dirk Willem te Velde discuss 
how AfT could complement a new UK trade policy. AfT 
will continue to play a key role in helping developing 
countries to reduce trade costs in the context of an 
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independent trade policy. In addition, it can complement 
trade and investment agreements and compensate 
vulnerable countries whose preference margins are eroded. 
The risks include AfT being diverted away from the 
poorest countries and being used as a bargaining chip. 
However, these risks can be minimised by increasing the 
volume of AfT and using additional financial transfers, 
both of which can be justified on the grounds of national 
interest, as AfT benefits both recipients and providers.
5. Regional perspectives on a new UK trade policy
Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz examines specific options for 
the UK’s preferential trade relations with a range of 
developing countries. Unilateral duty-free, quota-free access 
with improved rules of origin is suggested for LDCs; for 
non-LDC countries, there is a need to rethink the current 
EPAs to reflect the changes in regional configurations. 
Negotiations with Africa’s Continental Free Trade Area 
(CFTA) are considered, as is a UK engagement with the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership and other major G20 emerging 
countries.  
Mohammad Razzaque and Brendan Vickers ask 
whether the UK should use the existing EPA framework 
or devise a completely new framework in negotiations 
with non-LDC countries. Using the EPA framework may 
imply a re-opening of the negotiations and, as the UK 
will not be in the same bargaining position as the EU, this 
may prolong talks. The authors recommend that the UK 
request temporary WTO waivers for its ACP partners to 
ensure continuity of preferential treatment and the recent 
developments in ACP countries’ policy such as the CFTA.
There are specific principles that should guide the design 
of policy towards certain regions or countries. David Luke 
and Jamie McLeod analyse the implications of Brexit from 
an African perspective. They argue that the post-Brexit 
approach to Africa must be pro-poor and pro-development, 
and must ensure certainty for Africa’s exports. The UK 
should also take a continent-wide approach, in alignment 
with the CFTA and Africa’s other plans for continental 
regional integration. 
Ganeshan Wignaraja highlights the potential in the trade 
relationship between the UK and developing Asia, where 
engagement in regional value chains plays a key role. While 
recognising the challenges and the likely length of the 
negotiations, he argues that an FTA with China should be 
attempted, and points to the complementarities that exist 
between the two countries. In addition, the UK should look 
to engage more with the plurilateral agreements to which 
southeast Asian economies, China and India are parties. 
Finally, the UK should also pay more attention to Latin 
America. Max Mendez-Parra argues that, although the 
extent of bilateral trade is small, the UK could obtain 
quick, concrete results from negotiating agreements with 
some countries in the region. He points out that while an 
FTA with Brazil would be beneficial, Brazil’s membership 
of Mercosur makes this unlikely in the short to medium 
term. The UK may need to work harder to re-engage with 
the region.
Common messages 
The essays in this collection offer some initial thoughts 
from a number of leading trade experts. Despite the 
breadth and complexity of the issues, a number of common 
messages have emerged. 
Perhaps the most frequent of these is the value of the 
preferential access that LDCs receive to the UK market 
through the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), 
and particularly its Everything But Arms (EBA) element. 
Kennan estimates that they save LDC exporters €385 
million annually and non-LDC ACP exporters €205 million. 
Te Velde reports that preferences save Commonwealth 
exporters €715 million per year. The preferences not only 
give the LDCs an advantage relative to exporters facing 
most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs, but also reassure them 
that exporting will be relatively hassle free.
Some commentators, including Jones and Crowther 
et al., suggest that the margins of preference are the key 
advantage of EBA, and that the UK should take all possible 
steps to preserve them. Developing countries (both their 
governments and businesses) need certainty, so the UK 
should move quickly to confirm that existing arrangements 
will remain in place for a certain period of time following 
the UK’s departure from the EU. Others, including Evenett 
and Winters, argue instead that preferences are not the way 
forward and that the focus should be on liberalising imports 
to developing countries in general, reducing trade costs and, 
where necessary, offering adjustment assistance to LDCs 
that lose out significantly from reduced preferences.
A second common theme is the need to seek transition 
arrangements that extend current market access regimes 
well beyond the two-year horizon associated with 
the UK leaving the EU via Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union. For some, this stems from a desire to 
extend preferences indefinitely; others would like to offer 
developing countries some security in order to reduce 
uncertainty and prevent them from undertaking major 
adjustments unnecessarily. A third group maintain a simple 
pragmatic argument that the UK will not get around to 
dealing with most developing countries for several years. 
Page cautions that continuing with current regimes would 
preserve current patterns of advantage and disadvantage, 
which are more the product of historical accident than 
careful tailoring to current conditions. She suggests that 
any continuations should be no more than temporary 
expedients. 
A number of essays – especially those in the section on 
regional perspectives – highlight the differences between 
developing countries, and note that the right approaches 
for the UK to adopt and the prospects for striking new 
trade deals differ accordingly. This suggests that UK trade 
policy will need to be somewhat differentiated and that 
it will take time to renew the whole range of relations, 
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although some authors (e.g. Winters) caution against 
allowing the regime to become too complex. There are 
some strong arguments for signing an FTA with China (see, 
for example, te Velde’s estimate of a significant reduction 
in duties paid on UK exports) and for thinking about a 
pan-African arrangement, but there is also a strong sense 
for realism regarding the prospect of deals with certain 
other large emerging markets. 
A special element of EU trade policy for the last two 
decades has been the large-scale effort to sign EPAs with 
the ACP countries. The preferential access these agreements 
grant to UK markets is seen by many as useful, but attempts 
to encourage the developing countries to liberalise their 
own imports have not been overtly successful. Now the UK 
will be on its own, it may no longer be sensible to try to 
leverage trade liberalisation from most ACP partners. The 
UK will have much less influence than the EU over trade 
policies, and it is likely that any reciprocity that it demands 
of developing country partners will result in discrimination 
between different sources of imports in their schedules, 
with the consequential dangers of welfare-reducing trade 
diversion. The only exceptions are likely to be the few 
ACP countries for which the UK is the predominant trade 
partner, such as Ghana and Guyana (see the essays by 
Stevens and Kennan) or Fiji (see the essay by Jones).
Another common theme is that trade policy is now 
about far more than just tariffs. The UK can consider 
Brexit as an opportunity to go beyond tariffs and develop a 
‘gold standard’ trading policy that benefits both developing 
countries and the UK. Investment is intimately tied up with 
trade and there are many challenges arising from trade 
defence instruments and standards. Moreover, with services 
becoming ever more significant in countries’ trade bundles, 
it is necessary to consider their regulation and how one 
might weave them into development-friendly packages. 
The other non-tariff issue that needs to be considered is 
migration. We do not consider it here – not because it is 
not important either for trade or for development, but 
because it is deeply sensitive politically and there is, as yet, 
no indication of how the UK Government will define its 
overall stance on migration. All we do here is note that it 
is a subject to which we must return in the context of the 
UK’s relations with developing countries. 
AfT features in several of the essays and should certainly 
continue to be a core theme of UK trade relationships with 
developing countries. Evenett advocates the use of AfT in 
efforts to reduce trade costs, and Winters argues for its role 
in adjustment to new trade realities. Mendez-Parra and te 
Velde both argue that AfT can be good for recipients and 
providers, without the aid being tied to exports of the aid 
providers.
Conclusion
Due to the significant value of preferential access to the UK 
market for developing countries, transitional arrangements 
will be needed while a new UK trade policy is put in place. 
This new UK trade policy can be made more development-
friendly by going beyond tariffs to include new provisions 
on services, investment, rules of origin, standards and AfT. 
It will also need to differentiate amongst different types 
of developing countries, including, for example, seeking 
an African FTA, concluding a FTA with China and paying 
more attention to the Latin American region. There is 
much to contemplate in what could be a short period of 
time, but the essays in this volume argue that it is worth 
getting it right.
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Notes
1 The essay by Jane Kennan in Part III addresses this issue for the non-Least Developed Countries among the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries. Duties saved are €205 million annually. In separate calculations available elsewhere, 
Kennan estimates the amount of duties saved for LDCs as €385 million annually
Key messages
Following the vote to leave the EU on 23 June 2016, the UK is facing one of its most formidable policy challenges. 
A new trade policy will have to be designed. Much more attention needs to focus on how a new UK trade policy 
can contribute to development. The new UK trade policy and the relationships with developing countries will need 
to address the differences that exist among developing countries. 
 • Some developing countries, such as LDCs, depend on preferences in the UK market. They need certainty so the 
UK should move quickly to confirm that existing arrangements will remain in place for a certain period of time 
following the UK’s departure from the EU. Linked to this, the UK needs to put ‘transitional arrangements’ in 
place to minimise disruption. 
 • The value of the preferential access that developing countries receive to the UK market through the EU’s GSP, 
and particularly its EBA element, is considerable. They save LDC exporters €385 million per year, non-LDC 
ACP exporters €205 million and Commonwealth exporters €715 million.
 • Other developing countries are likely to be regarded mainly as valuable export markets with whom the UK may 
struggle to negotiate new trade agreements (e.g. Brazil, China, India) or hope to maintain current free trade 
access (e.g. Korea, Mexico, Turkey). The UK needs transition agreements for all of these given the time it takes 
to conclude new trade arrangements. The right approaches for the UK to adopt and the prospects for striking 
new trade deals differ, and it will take time to renew the whole range of relations. 
 • There are strong arguments for signing FTAs between the UK and major emerging markets (to which the EU 
does not already have duty-free access) – worth $7.3 billion in terms of lower duties paid on UK exports – and 
for considering a pan-African arrangement. 
 • A new UK trade policy can be made more development-friendly by going beyond tariffs to include new 
provisions on services, investment, rules of origin and standards. 
 • Preserving preferences should not take priority over lowering tariffs more generally if that makes sense for 
the UK and other partners. AfT may ease the strain of adjustment, especially in those countries dependent on 
preferences. AfT should continue to be a core theme of UK trade relationships with developing countries, in 
order to reduce trade costs and help adjustment to new trade realities in developing countries. AfT benefits both 
recipients and providers, without aid being tied to exporters of aid providers. UK AfT is highly valued, but its 
level is currently below that of the US and major EU countries.
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1. The UK’s trade policy towards 
developing countries: some 
principles
L Alan Winters, UK Trade Policy Observatory, University of Sussex
Abstract
Constructing a development-friendly UK policy is quite different from trying to influence EU policy in that 
direction. This essay sets out four principles to guide the process: recognise differences between developing 
countries; forget about influencing the EU; accept that the UK will have much less influence than the EU on 
developing country policies; and keep policies simple and pragmatic. 
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Introduction
Following the decision in the referendum to leave the 
EU, the UK needs to devise its own trade policy towards 
developing countries. The UK has a fine record on 
development aid and other support for development, so 
this process can be expected to be development-friendly. 
Designing a trade policy is complex, however, and this 
essay sets out four principles that should guide UK 
thinking about how to set about doing so.
Developing countries are not homogeneous
The UK must develop policies for several classes of countries 
– ranging from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to major 
emerging economies, such as China and India. The latter 
group will require tailor-made agreements whose principal 
drivers will be trade rather than development. However, 
these are not dealt with in this essay. 
The focus will no longer be on moulding EU 
policy
Much of the past 40 years’ effort on trade and 
development policy has been devoted to trying to mould 
EU policies – usually in a relatively market-friendly 
direction. There is now no role for this, and so a major 
shift in focus is required among UK trade and development 
officials. The UK may well retain influence on trade and 
development policy through global institutions such as 
the World Bank Group and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and indeed it should seek to exercise this to 
a greater extent than previously. As a smaller player, 
however, the UK will have less influence than the EU has 
had collectively. 
The UK will lose most of its direct influence 
over developing countries
This represents the largest change required in the UK 
mind-set. Despite being the fifth or sixth largest economy 
in the world, the UK will effectively become a small 
open economy that will have to take its environment as 
given. Thus, whereas the EU designed policies such as the 
Generalised System of Preferences+ (GSP+) and Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) to influence developing 
country governance and economic policies, this is not 
realistic for the UK, except in a small number of cases with 
very small economies that are highly dependent on the UK. 
This principle has two implications. First, using UK trade 
policy for broader policy leverage is likely to be ineffective 
unless it is explicitly combined with EU policy or that of 
several other players. Given the focus on sovereignty in 
the UK referendum debate, sinking policy discretion into 
a collective does not seem very likely, so broad political 
influence seems likely to be greatly reduced. That is, trade 
policy will become trade policy, not foreign policy. 
Second, and as a consequence of the first, one needs 
to recognise that any quid pro quo the UK extracts from 
developing countries for access to its market will be 
exceptions to the developing country’s policies, not the 
mainstream. Thus, for example, if the UK insists, as do the 
EPAs, that its developing country partners offer zero tariffs 
on most of its exports, this will not liberalise the partners’ 
trade policy so much as create a distortion that could 
lead to costly trade diversion away from more efficient 
suppliers. This potentially increases the tensions between 
the trade promotion and the development policy aspects of 
policy towards developing countries.  
Trade policy should be simple and pragmatic
I have advocated the former rule for decades, for the sake 
of economic and administrative efficiency, but the latter 
is now equally important. Simplicity suggests that the UK 
should aim to have only a few columns in its tariff schedule 
– perhaps one for EBAs (Everything But Arms) and one 
for non-LDC GSP recipients. Rules of origin should be 
forgiving and easy to administer for both exporters and 
the UK customs authorities. Likewise, using international 
standards for imported goods will allow developing country 
exporters to avoid producing solely for the UK.
Over the next few years, the UK, with a whole new 
trade policy to invent, will lack the capacity to develop 
detailed trade policies with many (or maybe even a few) 
developing countries. Therefore, it needs not only to keep 
things simple and modest, but also to seek the means to 
continue existing policies, even less than perfect ones, until 
it has time to work on them properly. For a transitional 
period of, perhaps, four years after its exit from the EU, the 
UK should consider offering developing partners exactly 
the same market access as, or obviously better access than, 
they currently have under EU auspices. One sequencing 
issue that may arise is, if the UK improves its access for 
imports from developing countries in general, the margins 
of preference for the LDCs will tend to decline. If this is a 
major problem for particular LDCs, the aid budget should 
be used to compensate and facilitate adjustment for a finite 
time period. This may be of particular relevance where 
(certain) developing countries are permitted to export into 
restricted, high-priced EU markets (for example, in sugar).  
Conclusion
Devising a new trade policy for the UK is quite different 
from contributing to the formulation of an EU trade 
policy. Officials will have to be brutally clear-headed and 
disciplined if they are to achieve it successfully. This essay 
has suggested four principles to help; the most important 
of which are that the UK will not be able to influence 
developing countries’ policies in the way the EU could and, 
given limited capacity in the UK and its partners, the policy 
must be simple and pragmatic.
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2. Facing up to political realities
Adrian Wood, University of Oxford
Abstract
This essay argues that the recent referendum not only requires the UK to define its trade policy towards 
developing countries but has also made British politics less development-friendly and more protectionist. It 
will therefore be important to identify ways in which UK trade policy can benefit developing countries with 
minimal costs to opposed groups in the UK.
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Introduction
As an advocate of global development, I know what I 
want the UK’s post-Brexit trade policy offer to developing 
countries to be: at least as favourable to them as what 
we now offer as an EU member, including Everything But 
Arms (EBA). I also want us to remain in the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries, and to use our membership to 
encourage more trade within Africa. Indeed, I would prefer 
to go further, by relaxing EBA rules of origin to match the 
US African Growth and Opportunity Act, lowering barriers 
to agricultural imports, de-escalating tariffs on primary 
products, removing tariff peaks on manufactures and easing 
access for Mode IV services.
None of this will strike other trade-oriented advocates 
of development as surprising or original; these are things 
for which we have been pressing for decades. But it has 
become less likely to happen. The balance of political 
forces in the UK has shifted in the opposite direction, and 
we are now in the world of Lewis Carroll’s Red Queen, 
where ‘it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the 
same place’.
Political analysis
Development assistance has for many years been as 
unpopular in the UK as membership of the EU. Its 
unpopularity has also been concentrated in the same 
groups and the attacks on it concentrated in the same 
newspapers (and in the same style) as those that 
successfully fought for Brexit. For 20 years, there was 
cross-party consensus on development, with Tony Blair, 
Gordon Brown and David Cameron all committed 
to increasing aid and giving the UK a leading global 
development role. But, as with the EU, that cross-party 
consensus concealed deep divisions within both the main 
parties, with large numbers of Conservative and Labour 
voters convinced that aid wastes money which could better 
be spent on deprived groups and other urgent needs in 
the UK. Those previously disenfranchised opponents of 
development assistance will now have more influence on 
government policy.
It is excellent that the new Secretary of State for 
International Development has in the past advocated more 
UK trade with the developing world (and the replacement 
of the Department for International Development by a 
Department for International Trade and Development). 
Among the supporters of the successful Brexit vote, 
however, are some potentially powerful protectionist 
groups. The people in the East Midlands, West Midlands 
and North East who voted overwhelmingly to leave 
remember the disappearance of their manufacturing jobs 
to East Asia and want more restrictions on developing 
country access to the UK market, not further relaxation. 
The rural communities that also voted overwhelmingly 
to leave the EU will likewise not want easier access for 
temperate agricultural imports, let alone reduction of 
trade-distorting agricultural subsidies. And the Prime 
Minister’s Joint Chief of Staff is a great admirer of Joseph 
Chamberlain, who founded the Tariff Reform League and 
was a consistent (though ultimately unsuccessful) advocate 
of protection against ‘unfair imports’.1
Conclusion
Trade-oriented advocates of development should continue 
to fight for trade policies that help developing countries. 
Nor is this cause without allies. Important groups 
within the main political parties – especially those in 
Westminster – still support such policies; there is a strong 
non-governmental organisation lobby for development. On 
some issues, support will come from the private sector as 
well. There are powerful external allies too: World Trade 
Organization rules would make it difficult for the UK to 
become more protectionist, and the UK would not want to 
reduce EU goodwill in the crucial negotiations over future 
UK access to the Single Market by upsetting the EU’s 
developmental status quo.
However, those who wish to maintain, and preferably 
improve, the development-friendliness of the UK’s trade 
regime will need to think carefully about how to deploy 
their limited forces. Efforts will need to be concentrated 
on the battles that are most worth fighting and that there 
is most chance of winning. Success therefore first requires 
economic and political analysis to identify those areas 
of trade policy where the largest gains for developing 
countries could be achieved with the smallest costs to 
opposed groups in the UK.
Notes
1 G. Parker, K. Allen and O. Ralph (2016) ‘Joint chief of staff gives May her policy edge’, Financial Times, 16 July.
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3. How should developing 
countries respond to the break 
between the UK and EU?
Sheila Page, Overseas Development Institute
Abstract
The UK’s trade objectives and future relations with the EU following Brexit are unclear. So too are the 
implications for developing countries. This essay argues that faced with this uncertainty, developing countries 
should focus instead on their relationships with the remaining EU members and the Word Trade Organization.
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Until the UK has clarified its trade objectives and its 
relations with the EU, it will be difficult for developing 
countries to assess either what they want or what they can 
get out of their own negotiations with the UK. Faced with 
this uncertainty, developing countries must decide how best 
to focus their efforts to protect their interests.
What do we know about the UK’s intentions?
We don’t yet know the UK’s objectives in its negotiations 
with the EU or other countries. The Brexit objective to 
‘take back control’ is hard to interpret, but some definition 
of it must be added to the normal objectives of policy 
before we can predict the UK’s negotiating position. Then 
we can try to predict the answers to the three questions we 
normally advise a developing country to ask when setting 
its own trade policy.  
What are the UK’s national objectives? The answer 
here includes economic welfare plus ‘control’, but also, for 
example, national security. Security may influence which 
countries the UK will negotiate with first. Neighbours like 
the EU? China?
What are the roles of trade and trade policy in achieving 
the national objectives? At a time when inflation is already 
a risk because the pound has fallen, and is potentially 
a greater risk if the UK restricts low-skilled migration 
(imposing the type of minimum salary requirement that 
exists for non-EU migrants would raise costs), the UK may 
be unlikely to raise tariffs, but the interests of industrial 
policy could counter this.
What other policies will affect trade? Possible changes 
in regulation are an obvious example, but these are so 
entwined with the arrangement the UK negotiates with the 
EU that other countries will have to wait for the outcome 
of this.
One unfortunate characteristic of the UK approach 
that is emerging is the influence of what the Australian 
economist, Werner Max Corden, referred to as the 
‘conservative social welfare function’ (Corden, 1974). 
‘Preserving access’ for developing countries that currently 
have special preferences would benefit those countries, 
but at the expense of other developing countries – that is, 
it gives a very high weight to losses of welfare over gains. 
Similarly, if preserving the rights of existing EU migrants 
in the UK and UK migrants in the rest of the EU were 
the alternative to maintaining modest continuing flows, 
one would be implicitly assuming that the welfare of 
incumbents has a greater weight than that of intending and 
potential migrants  
Another near certainty is that world trade is growing 
only slowly, if at all. This implies that protectionism will 
constrain all negotiations more than is usual. Negotiating 
simple adjustments to the UK’s trade regime quickly 
depends on ‘goodwill’ – in a zero sum world, this may be 
scarce.  
Negotiation priorities for developing countries
Most developing countries have special trade arrangements 
with the EU; some are intrinsic to the UK’s EU 
membership. Unilateral arrangements will need to be reset 
(or not) by the UK. Arrangements that were negotiated 
between developing countries and the EU will need to be 
replaced (or not) with new arrangements negotiated with 
the UK, and countries will need to consider if they also 
want to renegotiate the existing ones with the EU.
Existing arrangements
The Cotonou Agreement and the European Development 
Fund (EDF) – commitments by the UK as part of their EU 
membership – will form part of the UK–EU negotiations. 
Developing countries benefiting from them need to find a 
way of having a voice in these negotiations. This has never 
been easy for countries affected by EU negotiations to 
which they are not parties, as evidenced by the erosion of 
preferences and existing free trade agreements (FTAs) by 
subsequent FTAs. While this is an important issue, there is 
little developing countries can do about it.
Existing FTAs signed with the EU will not apply 
automatically to the UK. For developing countries with 
a high proportion of trade with the UK, particularly in 
products subject to trade barriers, the expected net benefits 
of these FTAs with the remaining EU members may have 
changed. If the benefits of an agreement with the reduced 
EU are no longer greater than the costs, a renegotiation 
should be requested. Developing countries should also 
ask if they would benefit from a similar (or different) 
agreement with the UK. 
New arrangements
The UK will need to decide whether to have its own 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), whether to allow 
any extra concessions for the least developed countries 
(LDCs) such as the EU has under Everything But Arms (EBA), 
and also whether to allow any special preferences for services. 
The only World Trade Organization (WTO) constraints 
here are that the UK should offer duty-free, quota-free 
entry for goods from the LDCs and that any other 
differentiation should be for clear categories of countries. 
Geographic discrimination (such as the US offers to 
African countries) would require a waiver – something 
that would not be impossible for developing countries to 
negotiate, but would be one more addition to an already 
full negotiating agenda.  
There are, however, negotiating constraints. Anything 
the UK offers to developing countries, just like anything it 
negotiates with the EU, will affect the value of the offers it 
can make in negotiations with other countries. As all these 
decisions will need to be made at once, the preferences 
offered by the UK could become issues when negotiating 
with India and Brazil, for example. Developing countries 
will therefore need to watch all negotiations carefully. 
Important, but little can be done.
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The priority for developing countries: 
negotiations with the EU
Negotiation with the UK should not be a priority for 
developing countries at this time. The net benefits of any 
negotiation are uncertain until the UK has indicated what 
its most-favoured nation (MFN) and GSP trade policies 
will be, what it will agree with its principal trading partner 
(the EU), and with which other countries it will sign FTAs.  
In contrast, developing countries can start their 
negotiations with the EU now because the EU’s trading 
approach is known and because it has greater capacity to 
negotiate than the UK. This should therefore be a priority 
for all developing countries with agreements with the EU.
The role of the WTO
One outcome of all these actual and potential changes in 
trade access is that the role of the WTO will become more 
important. It has been side-lined recently because there 
have been no urgent market access issues; now there are. 
Informal management and soft rules for world trade are 
sufficient when the basic structure is there; now two of the 
principal traders, the EU and the UK, need to change their 
trade regimes. For the UK and for all its trading partners, 
the WTO will be the fall-back regime until or unless new 
agreements are negotiated.  Small countries, at the back of 
the negotiating queue, are particularly unlikely to have an 
alternative ready within two years.  Regular and informed 
participation at the WTO by these countries will be a 
priority.
References
Corden, W.M. (1974) Trade Policy and Economic Welfare. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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4. Scenarios for UK trade policy 
towards developing countries 
after the vote to leave the EU
Dirk Willem te Velde, Overseas Development Institute
Abstract
Uncertainty surrounds almost every aspect of UK trade policy after the vote for Brexit. With potentially 
very large losses or gains from various different policy options, this essay considers the scenarios and the 
potential effects on developing countries.
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Introduction
The vote by the UK to leave the EU has already affected 
developing countries. The effects of the devaluation of 
the pound are being felt by developing countries through 
reductions in the dollar value of trade, aid, investment 
and remittances (Mendez-Parra et al., 2016). Moreover, 
uncertainty exists around almost every aspect of UK 
trade policy after the vote for Brexit, including the Article 
50 procedures to leave the EU, UK access to countries 
with which the EU has concluded FTAs, and continued 
access to the UK for developing country exporters. This 
combination of potentially large effects and heightened 
uncertainty lends itself to scenario-building.
Designing scenarios for UK trade policy
Possible scenarios for UK trade policy towards developing 
countries need to take various dimensions into account:
1. The type and response of developing countries, 
including Least Developed Countries (LDCs), non-LDC 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, and 
large middle-income countries.
2. The stance of UK trade policy. The UK is long believed 
to be a strong supporter of free trade, but free trade is 
being challenged globally, including by supporters of 
Brexit. We need to consider whether the UK trade policy 
stance will be protectionist, or mercantilist based on 
negotiations or free trade. 
3. The outcome of UK–EU negotiations. Whether the UK 
is in the Single Market, a customs union with the EU or 
a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU will determine 
the options available for UK trade policy towards 
developing countries. A key deciding factor will be 
whether the UK remains part of the customs union.
Table 1 sets out strategic options for UK trade policy based 
on these dimensions.
Three possible outcomes
A full discussion of all the options and effects is beyond the 
scope of this essay, so we consider three options here. 
First, suppose the UK turns more protectionist and/or 
offers fewer preferences, and does not stay in the customs 
union (bottom-right in Table 1). In this scenario, new 
UK trade arrangements have potentially large negative 
effects for developing countries exporting to the UK. 
Unpublished analysis by Stevens and Kennan for the 
Commonwealth Secretariat (and made available to us) 
suggests Commonwealth developing countries’ goods could 
face €715 million in additional duties – which we estimate 
to be equivalent to 3.2% of their exports – if subjected 
to EU most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs (this includes 
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, which together face duties 
of up to €479 million). If LDCs get an Everything But Arms 
(EBA) agreement, the effects will be lower. For the non-LDC 
ACP countries as a group, the potential losses could be up to 
€205 million (see the essay by Kennan in this series).
There are both potentially large positive and negative 
effects for UK exporters from new FTAs if the UK leaves 
the Single Market and is not in a customs union with the 
EU (middle-right in Table 1). Among the 27 largest export 
partners outside the EU are eight countries with an existing 
EU FTA (Chile, Egypt, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Norway, South 
Africa and Turkey) which could levy a total of €1.2 billion 
more on UK goods if the UK were not party to a new FTAs 
with them. But the UK could gain $7.3 billion from signing 
FTAs with Australia, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Canada, China, 
India, Japan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Taiwan, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates and the US (see 
Table 1: Options for UK trade policy towards developing countries 
UK trade 
policy stance
Scenarios for UK–EU relations
UK in Single Market and FTA with EU UK in custom union with EU World Trade Organization option, not in 
Single Market/customs union with EU
Open/free 
trade stance
Devise a UK GSP more liberal than the EU GSP 
in goods
Introduce UK (and EU) GSP for services
EU trade policy reform (goods)
UK liberal approach to services standards 
Zero barriers (e.g. tariffs, quotas) for goods, 
including for non-LDC developing countries 
Preferential services access
Ask for FTAs 
Neutral/
mercantilist 
stance
Follow EU offer and hope other countries 
agree to give UK same access as EU
Follow EU trade policy towards developing 
countries and hope other countries agree to 
give UK same access as EU
UK GSP between current EU trade policy and 
zero barriers to trade
Negotiate FTAs (in return) worldwide
Protectionist 
stance
Reluctantly offer same access to developing 
countries as EU and minimise quotas in 
agriculture/services
Hope other countries agree to give UK same 
access as EU
Follow EU trade policy towards developing 
countries and hope other countries agree to 
give UK same access as EU
Less than EU access for all developing 
countries (e.g. UK MFN access for non-LDC 
ACPs)
Hope other countries agree to give UK same 
access as EU
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Table 2). If realised – which is very doubtful given the time it 
would take and the interests of large countries such as Brazil 
and China (as discussed by Wignaraja and Mendez-Parra 
in this series) – this gain could be more than the UK would 
lose if the EU levied MFN taxes on UK exports (our own 
estimates suggests this is around $6.6 billion). Developing 
countries also gain through cheaper imports, assuming there 
is no trade diversion.
Finally, if the UK stays inside a customs union (first 
column in Table 1), there would be very little it could do 
to enable better (or indeed, worse) access for developing 
countries to its market, whatever its stance.
Table 2: Summary of duty payable on imports from the UK to the UK’s main export markets
Market Value of imports from the UKa (annual 
average 2013–2015, $000) b
Duty payable c Extra duty that would have been 
payable if the UK had not been 
eligible for EU preferences d$000 Applicable regime for the EU
China 20,435,551 2,663,673 MFN
Egypt 1,629,800 1,227,339 FTA 39,753
US 50,959,672 1,172,823 MFN
India 5,475,123 735,766 MFN
Brazil 3,224,158 491,890 MFN
Russia 6,524,742 329,938 MFN
Nigeria 2,174,557 313,729 MFN
United Arab Emirates 9,802,284 312,078 MFN
Thailand 2,877,394 304,712 MFN
Saudi Arabia 4,470,994 202,053 MFN
Australia 5,577,499 192,115 MFN
Malaysia 2,076,326 149,543 MFN
Norway 5,447,951 126,774 FTA 11,246
Canada 7,721,355 118,177 MFN
South Africa 2,888,279 116,919 FTA e 142,177
Azerbaijan 933,256 99,209 MFN
Taiwan 1,746,807 82,447 MFN
Qatar 1,619,601 73,276 MFN
Japan 6,393,213 67,717 MFN
Republic of Korea 6,817,505 38,883 FTA 447,053
Turkey 5,628,454 29,992 Customs union 277,501
Mexico 2,285,585 9,514 FTA 178,460
Israel 2,311,076 2,085 FTA 91,530
Chile 951,733 122 FTA 56,686
Hong Kong 10,753,695 - f MFN
Singapore 6,398,125 - f MFN
Switzerland 44,994,616 - f FTA
Total 222,199,351 8,860,773 1,244,406
Notes: 
a) As reported by the UK’s export partners. 
b) For most markets, 2012–2014 where 2015 data not available. The figures for Republic of Korea are an annual average for 2012–2013 only, and 
those for Egypt for 2014 only.  
c) The figures in this table are calculated on simple ad valorem tariffs only. The amounts are probably overstated because the maximum ad valorem rate 
applicable to any item within an HS 6-digit subhead has been used in the calculation, and definitely understated for all countries listed (except Brazil 
and Chile) because specific and compound duties are not taken into account and/or tariff rates are unavailable. The figures are therefore indicative only. 
d) In other words, the difference between the duty calculated under the MFN and EU preferential rates. 
e) The duty calculations are based on the rates applicable under the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement rather than the Southern African 
Development Community EPA, as tariff details of the latter are not yet available from the sources used. 
f) In Hong Kong and Singapore, all imports enter duty free other than a very small number of items subject to a specific duty. The share of the value of 
imports from UK subject to these specific duties was maximum 1.6% for Hong Kong and 0.02% for Singapore. All Switzerland’s imports are either 
duty free or (a large number) subject to specific duties. Under the EU preference, 99.8% of the value of imports from UK was duty free; under MFN, 
this percentage would have been 90%. 
Sources: Based on analysis provided by Jane Kennan, calculated using data from UN Comtrade, the WTO Tariff Download Facility, UNCTAD 
TRAINS and FTA schedules.
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Conclusion
This scenario analysis suggests that different developing 
country groups are likely to be affected differently. Large 
middle-income developing countries will increasingly be 
seen as export markets and therefore need to prepare 
for negotiations. Small non-LDC ACP countries will be 
vulnerable to UK policy options, depending on whether 
preferences are extended to them unilaterally (see the 
essay by Kennan in this series). LDCs are likely to keep 
preferential access, but they (and other preference-
dependent countries) may find that the competitive 
advantage of these preferences provide are eroded if 
UK MFN tariffs are low. This means that UK (regional) 
Aid for Trade will become more important than ever to 
compensate for the loss of preference erosion (see essay by 
Mendez-Parra and Te Velde in this series). 
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5. A new UK trade policy towards 
developing countries: what sort 
of transition?
Jim Rollo, UK Trade Policy Observatory, University of Sussex
Abstract
Renegotiating the UK’s post-Brexit trade relations with the EU and with the rest of the world will be complex 
and time-consuming. The process may cause particular uncertainty among the UK’s developing country 
trading partners. This essay examines these complexities and suggests some transitional arrangements to 
offer certainty to traders and governments of these countries.
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Introduction
The trade relationship between developing countries and 
the UK is complex and has been largely governed by EU 
policy. The process of the UK exit from the EU will be 
similarly complex and of an as yet indeterminate duration. 
The uncertainty generated by this could have significant 
negative consequences for trade between developing 
countries and the UK. This essay explores some of the 
complexities and proposes that the UK offer developing 
countries a continuation of existing arrangements after 
Brexit until any alternatives can be negotiated. 
Reinventing UK trade policy
UK trade policy is currently mainly made, directed and 
implemented at the EU level. As a result of its decision to 
leave the EU, the country will have to reinvent its trade 
policy. This could entail:
 • continuing with essentially the same policy as now but 
with purely UK management and perhaps a resulting 
drift towards a somewhat different policy over time and 
in response to changing policy pressures
 • a systematic and radical shift towards either a much 
more liberal or a much more protectionist trade policy or
 • a shift towards a mosaic of explicitly differentiated 
trade policy strategies depending on market, sector and 
domestic political imperatives.
Whatever happens may not emerge quickly. The UK 
and the EU need to agree on the terms of the divorce 
under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which could take 
two years or more. The EU and the UK also need to agree 
how the schedule of commitments agreed by the EU on 
behalf of the UK (and other member states) in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) should apply to the UK. This 
might take place as part of the Article 50 negotiations, or 
separately and later. 
Finally, the UK and the EU need to agree on the terms 
of their trade relationship, which could range from one 
governed by WTO most-favoured nation (MFN) schedules 
and agreements, to differing variants on a free trade 
agreement (FTA) all with some form of rules of origin 
requirements, to some form of customs union (less likely). 
Until it emerges from the Article 50 negotiations, 
the UK remains part of the EU and will implement any 
changes in trade policy agreed by the EU. It is possible, 
however, that there might be some form of ‘hard’ Brexit, 
which might entail an exit from the EU customs union 
before formally exiting the EU. This would mean that any 
products from third countries, and specifically developing 
countries, that have landed in the UK would no longer 
be in free circulation in the EU and might face the EU 
Common External Tariff and other trade policy rules and 
regulations reported to the EU27, depending on how origin 
is determined.
Implications for developing countries
All of these complexities suggest that it could take some 
time before the UK emerges from the EU and has full 
control of its own trade policy, and even longer before any 
changes to this inherited trade policy are agreed upon and 
then implemented. Developing countries face a varied set 
of trade regimes with the EU that any new UK trade policy 
might affect.
The UK will need to implement its own Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) for unilateral preferences. The 
system is composed of:
 • the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme with (UN-
defined) Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which 
allows duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for 
all imports (except weapons) from LDCs 
 • standard GSP status, which allows selected developing 
countries unilateral preferences 
 • GSP+, which grants more advantageous unilateral 
preferences to countries that meet selected human rights 
and other policy conditions. 
There is also a set of regional relationships with 
members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group 
of countries. These Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) take the form of reciprocal FTAs (the ACP 
countries offer reciprocal preferences to EU countries). 
This is complicated because the regional structure of 
the ACP partners means that LDCs (which already get 
unreciprocated free trade with the EU) and non-LDCs with 
quite different interests are bundled together – notably 
in Africa. Despite long negotiations, not all of the EPAs 
have been completed, although they might be within the 
timeframe of the UK’s withdrawal negotiations.1 However, 
it is not clear if the agreements will still apply on Brexit 
day even if the UK desires them to continue. Some or all 
of the ACP states may no longer wish to continue with the 
agreements as they currently apply to the UK. 
The structure and form of these agreements with the 
ACP countries are widely criticised, and there is room for 
the UK to offer improved versions. In the longer term, the 
UK could offer LDCs better rules of origin on duty-free, 
quota-free terms to encourage value chain formation. It 
could move from a regional EPA structure to one with 
individual ACP countries, allowing LDCs to retain duty-
free, quota-free terms. It could also offer more liberal rules 
of origin to remaining EPA states to encourage value chain 
formation. 
The real problem is uncertainty: even with transitional 
arrangements to maintain current access, there remain 
uncertainties about the nature of the UK’s new 
arrangements with the EU, how long they will take to 
negotiate and what they might imply for developing 
countries when the UK finally negotiates with them. Such 
residual uncertainty is likely to affect trade and investment 
adversely in developing countries. 
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Conclusion
To reassure governments and traders, the UK should 
offer developing countries a transition period, starting 
immediately on the date of exit from the EU, during 
which trading conditions remain exactly the same as on 
the day before exit. This would continue until the UK, 
in negotiation with the relevant countries, agrees an 
alternative set of arrangements in exchange for equivalent 
guarantees that any preferences given to the EU will 
continue to apply to imports from the UK after Brexit.  
This is not to argue that current EU trade policies towards 
developing countries are the best possible, but rather 
that, for developing country governments and traders, 
predictability is preferable to uncertainty over the timing 
or content of future British trade policy.
Notes
1 There are other EU agreements, notably with developing countries around the Mediterranean, which the UK will also 
potentially inherit where similar uncertainties might arise.
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6. Beyond tariff preferences and 
trade deals
Simon J. Evenett, University of St. Gallen
Abstract
Following Brexit, the UK can shift the focus of trade and development initiatives away from tariff preferences 
– which have limited value in an era of very low duties – towards measures that promote lower trade costs 
within and between developing countries. This essay makes the case for the UK to adopt a policy of equal 
treatment of imports from developing countries. 
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Introduction
Acting as a member of the EU or unilaterally, the UK 
has employed a range of measures in the conviction that 
greater integration of developing countries into world 
markets fosters progress. Free from the constraints of 
collective European action, what, if anything, should the 
UK do differently?
Preferences or equal treatment? 
A starting point is that the Brexit vote has not overturned 
the key underlying logic that greater integration fosters 
development. Those sceptical that the UK aid budget 
delivers value for money do appear to have gained in 
influence, but this important matter is distinct from the 
enduring logic relating to the integration of developing 
countries into the world economy.
How best to advance such integration? Preferences – of 
one type or another – have been a central part of the EU 
approach to promoting development through trade. It 
is curious, then, that the beneficiaries of such European 
largesse have not been that grateful, as the painful 
negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements have 
shown. Something else is clearly going on, and future UK 
policy should be informed by the travails of EU trade and 
development policy.
EU regional trade agreements became a Christmas 
tree that every influential development ministry and 
non-governmental organisation tried to adorn, often 
confusing ends and means, emoting over European values 
and frequently advancing proposals in the absence of 
supporting evidence. No wonder some governments in 
developing countries found this approach heavy-handed 
and not fit for purpose.  
EU tariff preferences didn’t just favour developing 
country imports over those from industrialised countries, 
they also discriminated between them. In practice, 
the EU Generalised System of Preferences ended up 
punishing successful exporters in some emerging markets 
and alienating their governments, required frequent 
adjustments that created uncertainty for businesses and 
muddled commercial and foreign policy goals. This is a 
classic example of the road to hell being paved with good 
intentions. 
In light of this mixed record, UK policy-makers should 
reflect on how effective trade preferences are in integrating 
developing countries into the world economy. Or, put 
differently, should the principle of equal treatment in 
commercial policy be the foundation for UK trade and 
development policy?
One practical reason for adopting a principle of equal 
treatment is that a more open UK trade regime and lower 
import tariffs will result in smaller tariff preferences 
anyway. If tariff preferences are tiny, they generate little 
reward for developing country governments for complying 
with whatever conditions a UK government might demand 
of beneficiaries, limiting the value of preferences as a 
foreign policy tool as well. Discussions about pursuing free 
trade agreements with, or a UK system of tariff preferences 
for, developing countries could become moot if the current 
UK Government adopts a more open import tariff regime. 
Some may wish to pursue trade deals with the large 
emerging markets to advance the UK’s commercial 
interests. Leave aside the matter of whether doing so can 
be genuinely labelled ‘trade and development policy’, the 
number of years it takes to prepare and conclude such 
negotiations, let alone implement the results (assuming 
full implementation actually happens), raises the practical 
question of whether there are other powerful tools available 
to the UK Government that can be put to work sooner.
Other policy options
Fortunately, trade deals and tariff preferences aren’t the 
only games in town as far as trade and development policy 
is concerned. The UK has been a leader in development 
policy-making circles in promoting the Aid for Trade 
initiative and, in light of implementation of the World 
Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Facilitation, there 
is still plenty of work to be done here. 
More generally, the focus on lowering trade costs 
within developing countries and between those countries 
and potential export destinations – through improving 
transport infrastructure and encouraging governments 
to tackle market power and paperwork requirements 
that create pinch points – can provide the basis for 
sound policy. Supporting the development of supply-side 
capabilities in developing countries to meet standards of 
western buyers is another worthwhile goal. 
Conclusion
Tariff preferences – whether unilateral or part of regional 
trade agreements are the cul de sac of UK trade and 
development policy. UK trade policy should treat imports 
from developing countries equally. There is plenty of good 
work to be done lowering trade costs and enhancing 
business capabilities in emerging markets – and the UK has 
the tools, experience and resources to deliver.
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7. Brexit: opportunity or peril 
for trade with developing 
countries?1 
Emily Jones, University of Oxford 
Abstract
Following Brexit, the UK will need to develop its own scheme of preferences and negotiate free trade 
agreements to replace those it currently has through the EU. This essay argues for a ‘bridging arrangement’ 
to avoid trade disruption for developing countries, and highlights the opportunity Brexit offers to make UK 
trade policy work for development. 
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Introduction
The UK is rethinking its position in global trade. Following 
the vote to leave the EU in the recent referendum, 
the Government has created a new Department for 
International Trade and is re-deploying several hundred 
civil servants to staff it. After more than 40 years, trade 
negotiations are seeing a revival in the UK. They are 
suddenly all the talk in town.
The UK Government is understandably preoccupied 
with reconfiguring trade relations with its major trading 
partners. Equally important for development, though, is 
how the UK will reconfigure trade relations with those 
developing countries for whom it is a major trade partner. 
For these countries, Brexit poses a real risk of substantial 
trade disruption. At the same time, Brexit offers a new 
opportunity to ensure UK trade works for development. 
Brexit puts trade preferences at risk
Preferences that are key for developing country access 
to the UK market will expire if (or when) the UK leaves 
the EU. At present, nearly all developing countries have 
preferential access to the UK market under the EU’s 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). By far the 
most valuable aspect of the EU’s GSP is the Everything 
But Arms (EBA) programme, which has provided duty-
free, quota-free access to the EU market to all Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) since 2001. This scheme has 
been particularly important for cultivating new revenue 
streams in some of the world’s poorest nations, including 
Bangladesh and Cambodia, which depend on the scheme 
to export garments. Many developing countries also have 
valuable preferential access to the UK market through 
EU free trade agreements (FTAs). At present, the EU has 
trade agreements with just over 50 countries, most of them 
developing. 
Following Brexit, the EU’s GSP and its FTAs would 
no longer apply to trade between the UK and developing 
countries. In the absence of new arrangements, developing 
country exporters would no longer have preferential access 
to the UK market. 
Although in general the UK is not a major trading 
partner for developing countries,2 some small developing 
countries rely heavily on the UK market. Belize, for 
instance, has sent nearly one quarter of its goods exports 
to the UK over the past five years. Other countries that 
rely heavily on the UK for their exports include Mauritius 
(20%), Fiji (15%), Gambia (14%), Sri Lanka (11%), 
Bangladesh (10%) and St Lucia (9%). 
Many of these countries export a narrow range of 
products that rely on preferences. With no post-Brexit 
mechanism in place to safeguard these preferences, 
garments and textiles factories in Bangladesh, cane sugar 
producers in Mauritius, Fiji and Belize and smallholder 
banana farmers in St Lucia could go out of business. 
How can preferential access be safeguarded?
Post-Brexit, a new arrangement will need to be agreed 
for UK–EU trade relations, and trade relations between 
the UK and developing countries will also need to be 
reconfigured. The debate in the UK is focusing on the 
differences between the various scenarios, which range 
from the ‘Norway model’, where the UK stays part of the 
Single Market, to the ‘WTO model’, where the UK relies 
on World Trade Organization tariffs to access the EU 
market. Yet, as far as preferential access to the UK market 
is concerned, all the scenarios have similar implications 
for developing countries, as the UK would manage its own 
external trade relations. 
The UK will need to take two steps to safeguard 
preferential access for developing countries. First, it will 
need to develop its own GSP. Norway, for instance, has its 
own scheme, modelled on that of the EU, which includes 
duty-free, quota-free access for LDCs (Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Second, the UK will need to 
negotiate FTAs and economic partnerships to replace those 
it currently has through the EU, including the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) it has with several groups 
of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.
The UK would also have discretion over the most-
favoured nation (MFN) tariffs it sets, as it would no longer 
be party to the EU’s Common External Tariff. The most 
extreme scenario, advocated by some Brexit supporters, 
is for the UK to eliminate all tariffs. This would create 
winners and losers among developing countries: while 
many would welcome increased market access, countries 
that currently enjoy high margins of preference into the UK 
market would face an erosion of the competitive advantage 
these preferences provide.
A bridging arrangement is needed
Devising a new GSP scheme and brokering new FTAs 
with developing countries will take time. To ensure trade 
is not disrupted, a creative ‘bridging arrangement’ will 
be needed. For instance, it may be possible for the UK 
to simply replicate the EU’s GSP for a limited period, 
pending the development of its own. Similarly, the UK 
could offer temporary, unilateral preferential access to 
developing countries that currently have access to the UK 
market through FTAs and EPAs. While such a move would 
violate WTO rules, it can be done – the EU has provided 
such access since 2007 for ACP countries pending the 
conclusion of EPAs.3
Given how stretched the UK Government will be, any 
solution will need to be relatively simple and quick to 
implement. Developing countries have ready allies in the 
UK for this task, ranging from the UK’s Department for 
International Development to non-profit groups that have 
championed fair trade and British businesses whose supply 
chains would be disrupted.
32 Brexit and trade
A silver lining for developing countries?
There may be a silver lining for small developing countries 
in all of this. The UK has a track record of pushing the EU 
to open up its markets to developing countries because, 
unlike for many southern European countries, imports 
from developing countries don’t compete directly with 
its own producers. Assuming that the UK doesn’t declare 
unilateral free trade, developing countries, and particularly 
LDCs, should identify areas where greater access to the 
UK market would be valuable. In a post-Brexit world, they 
may be pushing on an open door.
Notes
1 A longer version of this essay appeared on the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development website 
(http://www.ictsd.org/opinion/brexit-opportunity-or-peril-for-trade-with-small-and-poor-developing-economies).
2 Over the past five years, the UK has accounted for just over 2% of exports of goods from developing countries. Trade 
data are sourced from http://comtrade.un.org/ accessed via Comtrade on 14 July 2016. Calculations are the authors 
own. Data are averaged over the most recent five years for which data are available (2011–2015). Where data were 
missing, they were averaged for the available years.
3 Council Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007  
(see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:348:0001:0154:EN:PDF).
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8. Keeping the UK open for 
business post-Brexit
Barbara Crowther, Fairtrade Foundation
Liz May, Traidcraft
Matt Grady, Traidcraft
Abstract
UK businesses will be making decisions over the next few months with important implications for 
developing country suppliers. This essay argues that the UK should act quickly to address uncertainty 
following the vote for Brexit by committing to continued open market access for imports from the most 
economically vulnerable countries. 
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Introduction
Exporters, famers and workers depend on international 
trade for their livelihoods, supported in the UK by 
initiatives such as Fairtrade.1 Businesses will be making 
sourcing and investment decisions over the next few 
months that have important implications for developing 
country suppliers. To avoid trade disruption and higher 
costs for UK consumers, it is vital that the UK Government 
acts now to reassure these businesses that developing 
countries will continue to enjoy equivalent, or indeed 
improved, access to the UK market from day one of the 
post-Brexit arrangement. There is a real opportunity to 
take the lead internationally in building an outward-
oriented, pro-development regime, as well as an immediate 
need to design viable transitional arrangements. This 
should be done in an open and transparent manner, with 
parliamentary scrutiny and in a spirit of collaboration with 
trading partners in the developing world. 
A ‘gold standard’ open market access 
arrangement
The simplest way to ensure stability and signal the UK’s 
commitment to development is to set up a non-reciprocal 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) that improves on 
the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) and GSP2 schemes. 
A duty-free, quota-free scheme covering a wide range 
of products with no tariff peaks or escalations would 
not require resource- and time-intensive negotiations, 
and would sit alongside similar GSP schemes operated 
by other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries.
To ensure World Trade Organization (WTO) 
compatibility, such a scheme should incorporate a range 
of developing countries – both Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) and selected non-LDCs – based on objective 
criteria regarding economic vulnerability or development 
classification. Simple and flexible rules of origin should 
be incorporated to allow the widest possible definition of 
originating products (maximum regional cumulation) and 
to support regional integration. This will enable countries 
to continue to enjoy market access as they develop 
capacity for value-added production. To ensure stability 
for commercial relationships and investment decisions, 
an initial period of at least 10 years seems sensible. 
Consideration would need to be given to minimising 
unintended preference erosion, whereby countries see an 
erosion in the effective size of their preferences and the 
competitive advantage they provide, if a wider group of 
countries becomes eligible for duty-free access.
To ensure successful uptake, comprehensive awareness-
raising in collaboration with business associations 
and chambers of commerce should be launched, with 
particular emphasis on supporting small and medium-sized 
enterprises to take advantage of the new opportunities 
created.
Assessing the impact of free trade agreements 
on developing countries
The UK Government is keen to pursue free trade 
agreement (FTA) negotiations with developed and fast-
growing economies such as Australia, Canada, China, 
India, Singapore and the US. While it is unlikely that 
developing countries will be prioritised, each deal – and 
particularly those with large agricultural or mineral 
commodity exporters – will have implications for 
competing LDCs and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
partners. It will be important to conduct relevant impact 
assessments and incorporate strategies to minimise the 
negative effects of these deals on much more vulnerable 
economies, and also to analyse the implications of UK–
EU negotiations for developing country economies in 
recognition of supply chains routing into the UK via other 
EU member states.
Reviewing UK investment policy
The UK is an important global investor, with 105 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in place. However, UK 
investment policy has not kept pace with global reform 
trends, the introduction of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, the Sustainable Development 
Goals or the Paris Climate Accord. While countries such as 
South Africa and India are terminating existing BITs, UK 
treaties still include the outdated Investor–State Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, which enables foreign investors 
to sue governments for policy decisions while imposing 
no enforceable responsibilities on investors. The UK, as 
it develops an independent trade policy framework, must 
take a new approach to investment that better balances 
investors’ rights with responsibilities to contribute to 
sustainable development in host countries. 
Conclusions
The UK has an opportunity to develop a ‘gold standard’ 
open market access arrangement to enable the most 
economically vulnerable countries to increase their 
share of global trade and ensure stability for imports 
to the UK. Within this process, trade negotiations and 
policy must be transparent and consider the impacts on 
developing countries. They should also uphold national 
and international legislation and commitments on 
labour, human rights and the environment. As the UK 
reviews its approach to global trade, it should also review 
investment policy to ensure it supports the Government’s 
commitments to sustainable development.
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Notes
1 Fairtrade works with over 1.6 million smallholder farmers and plantation workers in some of the world’s poorest 
countries. In the UK, over 400 companies are involved in Fairtrade, and the UK retail market was worth over £1.6 
billion in 2015. Traidcraft, an example of a medium-sized UK Fairtrade organisation with a turnover of £11 million, 
purchased grocery and homeware products worth £3 million in 2015 from over 70 producer groups in 30 countries 
across the developing world.
2 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/index_en.htm 
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9. Brexit: a catalyst for EPA exit?
Christopher Stevens, Overseas Development Institute
Jane Kennan, Overseas Development Institute
Abstract
The UK’s exit from the EU’s trade agreements could alter their benefits for developing countries. Focusing on 
a group of countries for which Brexit may pose strong trade policy challenges, this essay asks whether Brexit 
will significantly reduce the costs of leaving their respective Economic Partnership Agreements.
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Introduction
The most widespread and possibly most substantial 
impacts of Brexit will result from changes to trade and 
investment flows (Mendez-Parra et al., 2016). However, 
there may also be early effects via changes to trade policy. 
For example, the basis for calculating ‘product graduation’ 
in the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) will 
change.1 
This essay provides an illustration of one potential 
development relating to the EU’s Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs). Although some African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) signatories have embraced the required 
policy changes, for many the whole EPA process remains 
deeply contentious. The post-Brexit announcement by 
Tanzania2 that it will not proceed with the East African 
EPA is merely the most recent example of delay and 
backtracking on implementation. 
Could Brexit herald the unravelling of some EPAs? 
A preliminary analysis of trade direction statistics can 
provide insight into how the departure of the UK from 
EPAs will alter the cost–benefit calculation on goods for 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) signatories.
Analysis
Where countries have signed EPAs ‘under duress’ to avoid 
the imposition of barriers to significant exports, will the 
cost–benefit calculation alter following Brexit? And are 
‘sensitive’ exports concentrated on the UK market (in 
which case, the cost of leaving might fall),3 or are they 
dispersed across several EU states? We offer a preliminary 
assessment for countries facing trade regimes outside of EU 
EPAs that would impose significant costs in terms of tariff 
increases on their goods exports (Stevens and Kennan, 
2016). 
Not all ACP countries have important exports that 
would necessarily be affected by Brexit. Seychelles’ 
sensitive exports, for example, are predominantly fish – for 
which the EPA is tangential to its fisheries agreement with 
the EU. For others, such as Mauritius, that appear to have 
embraced the required policy changes, EPA membership is 
relatively free of controversies. And Papua New Guinea’s 
EPA ‘liberalisation’ is less substantial than appears at first 
sight (Stevens et al., 2009). 
But there are countries for which EPAs are contentious 
and where significant exports would face increased 
barriers under any other EU regime. For these states, we 
have identified the share of their ‘sensitive’ exports to the 
EU that are sent to the UK (Table 1).4 Although the UK 
absorbs a significant share of imports, it is not a dominant 
EU importer for most ACP countries.  
Table 1: UK share of sensitive EU imports from selected EPA 
states
Country UK’s share of EU imports
Swaziland 9.6%
Namibia 15.5%
Ghana 29.3%
Kenya 27.3%
Grenada 97.2%
Jamaica 76.6%
Guyana 63.5%
Source: authors’ calculations using data from Eurostat’s COMEXT 
and UNCTAD’s TRAINS databases.
Conclusion 
In the broader context, the above analysis is good news.5 
Exports are not as heavily concentrated on a single, 
traditional market as may once have been the case, and 
for most ACP countries, the effect of the UK leaving the 
EU on EPAs will not be significant. But this does not offer 
any clear way forward for Kenya, for example, which has 
recently graduated out of the GSP for floriculture, or for 
Ghana, with its stalled Economic Community of West 
African States EPA negotiations. 
The exception is the Caribbean. Jamaica (which has 
increased rather than reduced some EPA tariffs) and 
Grenada export only a small share of sensitive exports to the 
EU27, and Guyana is not far behind. These sensitive exports 
are dominated by a small number of goods (sugar, rum, rice) 
for which the markets are changing fast, but in ways likely 
to diminish not increase the costs of EPA exit. And this 
analysis takes no account of services. But could it be that the 
region held up as the ‘EPA poster boy’ is the first to split?
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Notes
1 Under the EU regime, a country’s benefits are removed for a specific set of goods when the share of EU GSP imports exceeds 
17.5% (or 14.5% for textiles). After Brexit, this calculation will be made in relation to EU27 imports. 
2 Economy Watch (2016) ‘Tanzania Walks Away from the Trade Table’, 21 July, http://www.economywatch.com/
features/Tanzania-Walks-Away-from-the-Trade-Table0721.html 
3 Assuming that the UK does not become a separate EPA signatory (see Stevens and Kennan, 2016).
4 ‘Sensitive’ goods have been defined as all goods where the rate under the EU’s best available non-EPA regime is not a simple 
ad valorem tariff of 5% or less. This brings into the net all the EU’s non-calculable complex tariffs (see the essay by Kennan 
in this series).
5 Although, as with all analysis of post-Brexit trade, the news will be only as ‘good’ as the underlying EU statistics on the 
national destination of imports transhipped from one member-state to another.
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10. Brexit and African, Caribbean 
and Pacific non-Least Developed 
Country trade with the UK
Jane Kennan, Overseas Development Institute
Abstract
Following Brexit, the EU’s various preferential regimes will no longer apply to trade with the UK. This essay 
presents an analysis of UK imports from African, Caribbean and Pacific non-Least Developed Countries, and 
calculates that additional duties worth €205 million may be payable if no alternative arrangements with the 
UK are put in place. 
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Introduction
Other essays in this series have argued for the continuation 
of preferences by the UK to Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs). This essay examines the value of preferences to 
non-LDC African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries 
which also currently enjoy preferential access to the EU, 
and hence the UK, market. 
Assumptions and methodology
Some assumptions are needed to assess how much extra 
duty will be payable on these countries’ exports to the UK 
in the absence of the (mostly preferential) EU regimes under 
which they currently trade. The tariff regime(s) that will 
apply to UK imports post-Brexit is critical. The analysis 
undertaken considers two options: first, that the UK will 
adopt the EU’s current most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs 
only; and second, that it will adopt both the EU’s MFN 
tariffs and its Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). 
The EU’s complex tariff structure makes quantification 
of the duty payable far from straightforward. 
Approximately one fifth of its 15,000+ tariff lines are duty 
free, but the rest are subject to various types of duty1 all 
of which require further assumptions: (i) Ad valorem: a 
simple percentage of the import value, but because  tariffs 
are set at a 10-digit level and trade data are available only 
at a maximum of 8 digits, the analysis uses one rate: (ii) 
Compound: an ad valorem element plus a specific duty 
and in this analysis, only the ad valorem element of such 
duties is taken into account; and (iii) Specific: a charge 
related solely to quantity or content and in this analysis, no 
additional duty payable has been calculated.
The analysis here is thus only partial, and includes both 
possible overstatement and definite understatement2 of 
additional duties.
Figure 1 shows the value of imports colour-coded by 
type of MFN duty, which gives an indication of the extent 
to which the limitations described above affect the results 
discussed in the next section. In each country’s bar, grey 
indicates the imports that are duty free, pale green indicates 
ad valorem duty (which can be fully calculated but is 
potentially overstated), dark green indicates compound 
duty (which has been only partially calculated), and yellow 
indicates specific duties (which have not been calculated).
Although some countries’ exports to the UK are mainly 
duty free (e.g. Botswana and Nigeria), for others the 
picture is very different. Over 90% of the value of imports 
from Belize, Fiji and Guyana is subject to specific duties 
which have not been calculated for this analysis, while for 
Barbados, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and St Lucia the 
proportion is over 50%. All these countries also export 
goods that are subject to compound duties. 
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Figure 1: UK imports from non-LDC ACP countries by MFN duty type
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Results
Subject to the caveats above, Table 1 shows the additional 
duties that would be levied in case of a change in 
preferences. Three countries – Cuba, Gabon and Palau 
– are unaffected by either option because they currently 
trade on MFN terms. The remainder fall into three groups, 
namely, those for which the MFN+GSP option is either:
 • no different from the MFN-only option (because they 
are not eligible for the GSP)3
 • the same as the status quo (because they currently trade 
on GSP terms)4 or
 • better than the MFN-only option but worse than the 
status quo (EPA states eligible for the GSP).5
For the first two of these groups, no amounts are shown in 
the MFN+GSP column but their additional duty under the 
MFN-only option is included in the MFN+GSP total. 
To the extent that it has been possible to calculate extra 
duties, these amount to €205 million under the MFN-only 
option, and €186 million under the MFN+GSP option. In 
absolute terms, South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles and 
Ghana would experience the greatest increases. Seychelles 
and Mauritius are also the most affected in relative terms, 
along with Swaziland and Namibia. 
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Conclusion
The results of the analysis here show that non-LDC ACP 
countries benefit greatly from preferential access to the UK 
as part of EU trade agreements. It is essential that following 
Brexit, the UK maintains the value of these preferences.
Table 1. Scale of calculable additional duty payable under MFN-only and GSP+MFN options
Non-LDC ACP  
supplier
Value of UK 
imports (average 
2013–2015, 
€’000)
Share of value 
for which extra 
duty not
calculated 
Calculated potential extra duty 
(€’000)
Calculated potential extra duty as 
share of total imports from country 
concerned
MFN-only GSP+MFN a MFN-only GSP+MFN
 Totals 11,098,195 204,626 185,503 b
South Africa c 4,682,958 3.1% 63,822 n/a 1.4%
Nigeria 2,892,049 0.1% 1,738 – 0.1% –
Botswana 962,015 0.0% 2,582 n/a 0.3%
Kenya 347,473 0.6% 18,337 13,812 5.3% 4.0%
Ghana 325,623 7.5% 22,468 18,004 6.9% 5.5%
Mauritius 287,978 16.3% 41,232 n/a 14.3%
Côte d’Ivoire 194,670 12.9% 4,632 2,780 2.4% 1.4%
Dominican Rep. 177,836 84.4% 1,307 n/a 0.7%
Papua New Guinea 151,261 0.4% 10,083 4,224 6.7% 2.8%
Cameroon 146,902 17.2% 202 40 0.1% 0.0%
Congo 131,928 0.0% 124 – 0.1% –
Seychelles 109,780 0.1% 25,685 n/a 23.4%
Gabon 96,622 0.0% – –
Belize 89,341 93.5% 530 n/a 0.6%
Guyana 78,807 91.1% 30 n/a 0.0%
Trinidad and Tobago 72,011 2.9% 164 n/a 0.2%
Cuba 69,676 0.4% – –
Jamaica 68,176 68.3% 1,514 n/a 2.2%
Namibia 67,659 0.1% 5,381 n/a 8.0%
Fiji 57,332 94.3% 180 121 0.3% 0.2%
Zimbabwe 40,362 0.2% 2,314 n/a 5.7%
Swaziland 16,382 26.6% 1,739 1,422 10.6% 8.7%
Barbados 8,358 51.2% 52  n/a 0.6%
St Lucia 7,983 88.0% 48 n/a 0.6%
Bahamas 5,955 6.9% 317 n/a 5.3%
Antigua and Barbuda 2,698 1.4% 16 n/a 0.6%
Dominica 1,516 31.1% 47  n/a 3.1%
St Vincent/Grenadines 906 11.2% 22 n/a 2.4%
Marshall Islands 861 0.0% 6 – 0.6% –
Grenada 571 31.1% 24 n/a 4.1%
Suriname 379 20.9% 10 n/a 2.5%
St Kitts and Nevis 269 30.9% 3 n/a 1.3%
Micronesia 183 0.0% 8 – 4.6% –
Nauru 159 0.0% 2 – 1.3% –
Cape Verde 142 0.0% 4 – 3.2% –
Niue 64 0.0% 0 – 0.4% –
Cook Islands 50 0.0% 1 – 1.3% –
Tonga 33 5.1% 2 – 6.3% –
Palau 7 0.0% – –
Note:  
(a) ‘n/a’ denotes that a country is not eligible for GSP treatment; ‘–‘ denotes that a country is currently benefiting from GSP treatment.  
(b) This total includes the extra duty shown in the ‘MFN-only’ column for countries ineligible for the GSP or that already trade on GSP terms. 
(c) Additional duties calculated in comparison with the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement, as South Africa’s rates under the 
Southern African Development Community EPA are not yet available in UNCTAD’s TRAINS database. 
Sources: Calculated using data from Eurostat’s COMEXT and UNCTAD’s TRAINS databases.
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Notes
1 Moreover, many imports are recorded in ‘special codes’ (relating to goods carried by post, confidential trade, etc.), for 
which no tariff data are available. 
2 Other than for Cape Verde, Nauru, Niue, Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau, from which the UK did not import 
any goods subject to compound or specific duties in 2013–2015. 
3 Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Zimbabwe. 
4 Cape Verde, Congo Republic, Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue and Tonga. 
5 Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, Kenya and Swaziland (see http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/
taric_consultation.jsp?Lang=en&Screen=0&redirectionDate=20101026). In addition, the analysis assumes that Papua 
New Guinea would, as a lower-middle-income country, be eligible. 
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11. Foreign investment and UK 
trade policy post-Brexit
Stephen Gelb, Overseas Development Institute
Abstract
The process of defining the UK’s post-referendum trade policy also offers the opportunity to renew its foreign 
direct investment (FDI) policy. This essay argues that the new FDI policy regime should include more open 
and transparent dispute settlement mechanisms, and should emphasise the promotion of investment and its 
development impact in the context of global value chains which closely link investment and trade.
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Brexit is an opportunity
The discussion of UK trade policy post-Brexit, or at 
least since the 23 June referendum, has barely addressed 
the issue of foreign direct investment (FDI). This is not 
surprising, as trade and investment policy are rarely 
considered together, even though they are (increasingly) 
closely linked. However Brexit eventually unfolds, the new 
situation will require a rebooting of UK investment policy. 
Brexit offers a timely opportunity for this reboot, focusing 
on both investment regulation and protection and also 
investment promotion, as well as an opportunity to link 
investment and trade issues more closely.
The FDI environment has changed, but UK 
investment policy has not
The opportunity is timely because the policy context for 
FDI and its impact on developing countries has changed 
substantially over the past decade or more, in several 
respects. Investors from developing countries have become 
significant actors, not only along south–south paths, 
but also as south–north actors. The pertinence of global 
value chains (GVCs), involving not only trade but also 
investment in triangular or quadrangular networks and 
flows, has become better recognised by policy-makers. 
Social and environmental concerns have become central 
to our understanding of what development means, as 
encapsulated in the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). And these three trends have contributed to a 
fourth – the emerging global consensus that the bespoke 
international legal institutional framework for investment 
protection is in dire need of modernisation. 
The UK’s investment regulation and protection 
regime was already in transition, as the Lisbon Treaty 
of 2009 shifted this competency from member states 
to the EU, which entered negotiations with the US on 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) following those concluded with Canada on the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). 
The UK has 109 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) either 
in force or signed, and EU treaties would have replaced all 
of these eventually.1 This will no longer happen, but the 
UK’s treaties should be updated nonetheless. 
The UK’s investment treaties are old. Only 15 have 
been signed since 2000 and only six in the past decade, 
of which only the 2010 treaty with Colombia is still in 
force.2 They are also old-fashioned in that they don’t take 
account of the new realities of international investment. 
Key developing countries – including India, Indonesia and 
South Africa – have begun overhauling their investment 
treaties, and the UK will have to enter negotiations on 
investment with these countries, in which it is a major 
investor. In the wake of Brexit, the EU won’t do this on 
the UK’s behalf, and these trading partners will insist on 
investment being included in trade negotiations with the 
UK. Any investment treaty renegotiation exercise could, 
and should, be broadened – trade negotiations with other 
developing countries should cover investment too, as is 
now the standard approach followed in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), TTIP and CETA.
A first step towards this would be a model investment 
chapter for future trade agreements, reflecting a new 
approach to investor–state dispute settlement. It is widely 
agreed that more   transparency and an appeal mechanism 
are needed, but there is also strong popular opposition 
to access for foreign investors to a bespoke international 
process to sue host states, as underlined in the European 
debate over TTIP. This anxiety about the unequal impacts 
of globalisation reflects the impulse that contributed 
significantly to the Brexit vote. This is an important 
consideration for new UK investment policy, especially 
given the growing importance of the UK as a host for 
developing country inward investors.
For the same reason, and to address domestic concerns 
within the UK as much as developing country needs in 
relation to UK outward investors, a new model investment 
agreement also needs to explicitly address sustainability, 
which existing treaties ignore. There is a need for social 
and environmental ‘policy space’ in host economies to 
balance the needs of investors and those of domestic 
constituencies. For example, governments need to be able to 
shift policy without fear of being sued by inward investors 
for contravening their ‘fair and equitable treatment’ rights, 
as occurred in Germany twice, when the Hamburg city 
government and then the federal government planned 
to move away from nuclear energy and were sued by 
Vattenfall, a Swedish state-owned enterprise supplying 
nuclear-sourced electricity in Germany.  Fiscal sustainability 
and tax obligations of investors are also relevant here, 
as the investment agreement regime should support 
governments’ efforts to regulate corporate tax avoidance.
GVCs imply new approaches to investment and 
trade promotion are needed
Investment promotion should be emphasised more than 
in existing investment treaties, which focus on rights of 
investors and obligations of host countries, but not the 
reverse. Mechanisms must be introduced to enhance 
development impact on both sides – host and home 
countries. UK investment policy should also take explicit 
account of GVCs, which may involve a small capital flow 
from the UK into developing country host markets, but a 
central role for UK companies in market provision and, 
most crucially, in value chain leadership and coordination. 
The promotion of investment and of trade are closely 
connected in this context, and require some integration 
across national jurisdictions. The UK is already engaged 
in some early examples of this multilateral cooperative 
approach, such as the Partnership for Investment and 
Growth in Africa, involving government agencies in China 
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and four African countries, and the UN/World Trade 
Organization International Trade Centre.
Conclusion 
The UK’s international investment policy had entered into 
a transition phase well before the Brexit referendum, as 
the legal framework was in the process of ‘migration’ to 
the European Union, while investment promotion was 
beginning to address new realities such as global value 
chains, where UK capital flows per se are not necessarily 
the central issue. The referendum result has had the 
positive if unintended consequence that investment policy 
renewal must be accelerated, and should be a central 
consideration as the trade policy debate unfolds. 
Notes
1 Source: UNCTAD database. Some treaties are with other EU member states and would not be replaced; treaties with 
Romania and South Africa have been terminated. 
2 The UK replaced its 1991 ‘model BIT’ in 2008, but the new version barely differs from the earlier one. 
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12. Anti-dumping and gaps in 
the European Economic Area 
model: two neglected issues
Peter Holmes, UK Trade Policy Observatory, University of Sussex
Abstract
This essay addresses two technical questions often overlooked in broader discussions about post-Brexit 
trade policy: What sort of anti-dumping regime might the UK have? And how could some of the ways that 
European Economic Area membership differs from full EU membership affect developing countries?
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Introduction
There is a tendency to think about the openness of post-
Brexit trade policy in terms of tariff levels and preferences. 
This essay covers two further issues that may affect 
developing countries: anti-dumping policies; and the 
side-effects of possible UK membership of the European 
Economic Area (EEA). The second could indirectly but 
significantly affect countries selling materials to the UK 
that are then incorporated into further exports to the EU.
Anti-dumping
Whether the UK will end up with a more or less open trade 
policy may have more than one dimension. It is possible 
that the UK will sign trade agreements that incorporate 
tighter contingent protection rules than we have now. 
We have seen a subtle example of this in the European 
Commission’s proposals for Market Economy Status 
(MES) for China, with the Commission proposing to offer 
China MES while toughening the rules for all trading 
partners, preserving most of its ability to put anti-dumping 
duties on Chinese goods.
On the other hand, many supporters of Brexit have 
argued that a post-Brexit trade regime will be more 
open to the wider world, even if the arrangement with 
the EU is less close. The Brexit campaign had a clear 
anti-globalisation current, however. Although this was 
focused primarily on migration issues, the sense is that 
Brexit voters felt they had been losing out from import 
competition as well. Brexit supporters’ hope for a free 
trade agreement (FTA) with the US would not really 
threaten jobs in declining industries, but a UK–China FTA 
would hardly be welcomed by those who see low-wage 
competition as having undermined unskilled jobs. It is an 
article of faith among economists that, even if jobs are lost 
as an economy undergoes trade liberalisation, the efficiency 
gains that result will be more than enough to compensate 
the losers. But in times of austerity, there has been little 
or no financial compensation for trade adjustment 
assistance. Recent research in the US, for example, suggests 
that in regions particularly affected by Chinese import 
competition, there has been no increase in other more 
productive activities as uncompetitive ones have declined 
(e.g. Autor et al., 2016). 
For many economists, the implication is that there 
should have been more adjustment assistance, but there is 
political resistance to this. Moreover, anti-globalisation is a 
matter not simply of the financial costs of adjustment, but 
also of the loss of dignity associated with the disappearance 
of traditional jobs. Hence, in the case of the steel industry 
in Wales, many economists who are traditionally opposed 
to anti-dumping see no alternative to its use in the absence 
of adjustment assistance in regional or industrial policy. It is 
ironic that the UK Government, having opposed the use of 
anti-dumping, will inevitably face the choice of how best to 
develop an anti-dumping policy. 
Theresa May’s close adviser, Nick Timothy, recently wrote:
The EU could impose retaliatory tariffs on Chinese 
steel products, as the United States has done and other 
member states would like to do, but it is the policy of 
the British Government to oppose these measures.1 
A post-Brexit government might have other ideas.
Clearly, the starting point will be the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) anti-dumping rules, but there is a 
great deal of discretion in how these are implemented and 
used.  The WTO rules contain considerable flexibility in 
how dumping and injury are calculated, what attention 
needs to be paid to consumers and how products are 
defined, as well as in institutional matters such as who 
can file anti-dumping complaints and who can challenge 
decisions.  One fundamental choice will be whether the UK 
will seek to create institutional arrangements to protect 
politicians from protectionist pressures, as in the Australian 
system, or instead will facilitate the ability of politicians to 
appear to be hearing the voters’ pain. 
There is a certain built-in bias towards a more 
protectionist outcome, because if an anti-dumping suit 
is brought within the UK it will be easier to show injury 
has occurred, since the market concerned is smaller. And 
UK policy-makers, who are answerable to their own 
voters in a way that the European Commission is not, will 
make the ultimate decision. Perhaps the UK Government 
will attempt to build a wall around the process, but very 
liberal anti-dumping rules seem unlikely if they are written 
when the country is seeing its growth slow and its current 
account deficit at a historical high, and the population 
is wary of globalisation. The Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) are largely outside the range of anti-dumping fire, 
but emerging markets such as Brazil, China, India and 
Pakistan need to watch closely. Tighter anti-dumping rules 
are a very likely corollary of Brexit. 
The implications of EEA membership
A second issue that may affect LDCs relates to the nature 
of the EEA. It is customary to argue that the ‘Norway 
model’ would offer full access to the EU Single Market 
while allowing the UK to have its own FTAs with third 
countries, and indeed its own anti-dumping policy. But 
in fact, the EEA does not offer full access to the Single 
Market in the same way that EU membership does. 
The EEA is an FTA, not a customs union. While goods 
originating in the UK would have duty-free access to the 
rest of the EU, this is not the case for third-country goods 
imported into the UK and re-exported, including in some 
cases those incorporated into products made in the UK. 
The EEA has rules of origin, so products with a high share 
of imported components or materials in their content may 
be treated as third-country products and charged duty if 
they are not truly of ‘UK origin’. This could apply to cars 
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or electronics made in Japanese-owned factories, and also 
to chocolate made with imported sugar and cocoa. The 
rules of origin are, in principle, laid down in detail in EEA 
agreements, but the paperwork needed to prove origin can 
be costly to obtain and, above all, a cantankerous customs 
official can insist on inspections.
A further dimension of this concerns the way 
harmonisation and mutual recognition work. If the UK 
were in the EEA, it would acquire full freedom to sign 
FTAs with whomever it wants, but not necessarily full 
freedom to negotiate modifications to non-tariff barriers.  
EEA countries must apply EU rules where they exist, and 
must accept mutual recognition where they don’t, but the 
process of mutual recognition of conformity assessment 
that is required to prove that products satisfy EU norms is 
complex. 
Some free traders and developing countries criticise EU 
food safety rules as being excessively cautious, and there 
might be a temptation to relax either product requirements 
or the testing and conformity assessment requirements with 
LDCs. Could the UK do this if it were in the EEA? Not 
necessarily. If the EU does not have mutual recognition for 
conformity assessment with that LDC, the goods could not 
be sold on into the EU. But could the UK actually conclude 
a mutual recognition agreement (MRA) on conformity 
assessment with a country that the EU does not have such 
an agreement with? The European Free Trade Association 
website suggests that the EU discourages its EEA partners 
from signing MRAs with anyone the EU has not signed 
with. In fact, the UK would be constrained in its ability to 
include MRAs in any FTAs if it wants to maintain even the 
partial Single Market access that Norway has. 
Conclusion
The impact of a post-Brexit UK trade policy will not 
simply depend on tariff levels; there may be a trade-
off between tariff liberalisation and the risk of the 
application of contingent protection. Moreover, developing 
countries need to be aware that, if the UK is in an FTA 
relationship with the EU, access to the UK market will not 
automatically translate into access to the rest of the EU, 
and the UK will not necessarily have freedom to reduce 
non-tariff barriers.
Notes
1 N. Timothy (2016) ‘Port Talbot, globalisation – and the governing class that gains from mass immigration while 
poorer people lose out’, Conservative Home, http://www.conservativehome.com/thecolumnists/2016/04/nick-timothy-
port-talbot-should-make-us-question-the-unthinking-liberalism-of-our-governing-classes.html
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13. Brexit and trade in services: 
securing future gains
Jodie Keane, Commonwealth Secretariat
Abstract 
The Brexit shock has already had major implications for the services trade. This essay explores some of the 
implications of Brexit for the CARIFORUM region, whose Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU is the 
only comprehensive agreement in place that covers services, investment and e-commerce. It also discusses 
the challenges involved in such analyses.
Brexit and trade 51 
Introduction
The EU’s Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
with the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) is the only 
comprehensive agreement in place that covers services, 
investment and e-commerce. As the EU currently does 
not include services within its Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) regime, the CARIFORUM EPA is seen 
as a benchmark against which to measure any future 
trade agreements. However, obtaining accurate data on 
services trade and its respective barriers remains a major 
challenge for the international trade community. This is 
likely to be of major concern to UK negotiators in view of 
the overriding economic importance of this sector to the 
economy, as well as those within the CARIFORUM.
The UK’s post-Brexit relations with 
CARIFORUM
The major potential areas for trade gains are likely to fall 
within the realm of services and the removal of non-tariff 
measures for both the UK and CARIFORUM. Such a 
process could help overcome restrictions on both outward 
as well as inward investment for both regions. 
Since commitments made under the CARIFORUM EPA 
are more ambitious than those in the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS), a move by the UK towards 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) model – described 
in many analyses of the trade implications of Brexit – is 
likely to be disadvantageous. Major gains were secured 
under the EPA relative to GATS commitments, including in 
relation to Mode 4 and the temporary movement of people 
(among them, graduate trainees). The Protocol on Cultural 
Cooperation is innovative, and commitments undertaken 
in the entertainment services sector are viewed positively in 
relation to the emergence of the animation industry. 
The UK could seek to maintain the status quo, or 
alternatively could pursue a more liberal stance compared 
with the EPA. However, the identification of areas where 
the UK could go further in terms of its liberalisation, 
as well as where additional concessions might be made 
towards the UK relative to the EU by the CARIFORUM, 
will need to bear in mind application of the most-
favoured nation (MFN) clause.1 In this regard, the relative 
importance of the UK and EU markets needs to be 
carefully assessed. The areas in which the EPA has already 
resulted in economic benefits, as well as the potential for 
these to increase, should be evaluated. 
The challenges for future analysis
A more detailed evaluation of the trade-related effects of 
EPA implementation with a particular focus on trade in 
services is urgently required, and should build on previous 
efforts undertaken thus far (e.g. Greene, 2015). However, 
such an exercise will invariably confront major data 
limitations as well as capacity constraints with regard to 
both obtaining and compiling the necessary data. 
As discussed by Low (2016), while all WTO signatories 
have schedules of market access and national treatment 
(non-discriminatory treatment between domestic and 
foreign services and service providers) commitments, many 
of these fail to capture the actual level of access granted 
to services of foreign provenance. Only recently has it 
become feasible to measure trade in the same way as gross 
domestic product (GDP), leaving behind the uncomfortable 
juxtaposition of value-added estimates of GDP and gross 
numbers for trade. 
Major challenges persist, however, and it is generally 
recognised that advances in statistics by enterprise 
characteristics and by mode of supply, which take account 
of the movement of both labour and capital, are required 
(Lanz and Maurer, 2015). Securing new concessions within 
the realm of services trade for the UK in CARIFORUM, and 
vice versa, will require painstaking analysis and demand 
the skills of the private sector. These includes the ability 
to effectively trace company ownership structures, their 
transactions, as well as the main constraints they face in 
relation to expansion and sustainable investment practices.  
Conclusion
Assuming Article 50 is triggered, the sequencing of the 
hierarchy of new trade regimes negotiated by the UK, as 
well as depth and breadth of concessions, will require 
careful monitoring by all African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) group members, but the CARIFORUM will need to 
pay particular attention to commitments made on services 
trade. Unlike in the CARIFORUM EPA, the investment 
and services component in the African EPAs remains on 
the negotiating table. These are areas where the European 
Commission has only recently gained exclusive competence 
under the Common EU Investment Policy.
One future possibility is the inclusion of services within 
the UK’s own autonomous GSP regime. This could address 
the differentiation issue more effectively and broaden an 
Everything But Arms (EBA)-type regime, inclusive of services, 
to small vulnerable economies and Small Island Developing 
States, as well as to the Least developed Countries. 
How the UK’s future trade regimes will be designed to 
reflect its own commercial policy and new trade strategy 
remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the UK could seek 
to redress some of the criticisms of the EU’s common 
approach to international investment, which include the 
lack of a definition of foreign direct investment and thus 
the scope of EU exclusive competence, as well as the main 
elements which could be defined in relation to sustainable 
investment policy. 
Any shortcomings and/or views expressed in this paper 
are the author’s own and are not attributable to the 
Commonwealth Secretariat.
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Notes
1 Controversy has arisen over Article 70 (1) b, which allows established firms and investors in the EU to benefit 
unconditionally, via the EPA’s MFN provision, from any more favourable treatment that the CARIFORUM states may 
provide to any industrialised country or major trading economy (e.g. the US, Canada, the BRICS and now, potentially, 
the UK).  As discussed by Sauve and Ward (2015), paragraph 5 of Article 70 states that, when a CARIFORUM state 
becomes a party to such an economic integration agreement, the EC and the CARIFORUM states shall enter into 
consultations to decide whether the CARIFORUM state may deny the more favourable treatment to the EC party.
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14. Aid for Trade as a 
complement to a new UK  
trade policy
Max Mendez-Parra and Dirk Willem te Velde, Overseas Development Institute
Abstract 
The UK is a major provider of Aid for Trade (AfT) through bilateral, EU and multilateral channels, bringing 
benefits to both developing countries and the UK. In the context of an independent UK trade policy, AfT will 
continue to play a key role in stimulating development. It will also take on new roles in complementing UK 
trade and investment agreements to reduce trade costs and compensate vulnerable countries.
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Introduction
Much has been written about the motivation and effects 
of Aid for Trade (AfT) (te Velde et al, 2013). AfT includes 
aid funds spent on improving infrastructure and building 
productive capacities in developing countries. It has also 
been used to develop and modernise institutions dealing 
with trade in developing countries, such as customs, 
to make their procedures more efficient. The origin of 
AfT dates back to the 2005 Hong Kong World Trade 
Organization (WTO) declaration, which calls for assistance 
to help countries implement trade agreements – including 
compensating countries whose preferences are less 
valuable in the presence of lower tariffs (so that countries 
suffering preference erosion have something to gain from a 
multilateral trade deal) – and adjust to new trade realities. 
AfT has become an integral part of the recent WTO Trade 
Facilitation Agreement, with the aim of reducing trade 
costs by addressing inadequate transport and logistics 
infrastructure and inefficient institutions.
AfT was originally not meant to be aid in the traditional 
sense, but in recent years it has become accepted to count 
specific parts of aid (trade policy, economic infrastructure, 
productive capacity, trade-related adjustment) as AfT. 
Based on this definition, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and WTO report 
that the UK provided $1.4 billion in AfT in 2013 out of a 
global total of $41.6 billion (OECD and WTO, 2015). In 
comparison, the US and Germany provided $3.4 billion 
each, France provided $1.9 billion, and $7.1 billion 
was provided by EU institutions such as the European 
Commission. 
The UK’s Aid for Trade programmes
The UK has been active in designing AfT programmes. One 
example is the creation in East Africa (through TradeMark 
East Africa) of UK aid-financed one-stop border posts, 
which harmonise customs checks at borders and reduced 
the time to transport cargo from the port of Mombasa in 
Kenya to Kampala, Uganda, from 18 to 4 days between 
2013 and 2014 (TradeMark East Africa, 2015). The UK 
has also assisted developing countries to negotiate trade 
agreements through its Trade Advocacy Fund.
AfT confers a mutual benefit to recipient and sending 
countries. A reduction in trade costs helps recipients grow 
and increase their international competitiveness, expanding 
the quantity, quality and complexity of their exports, 
which helps transform economies. At the same, this helps 
countries that send AfT, since they benefit from cheaper 
imports and stronger exports. One estimate shows that 
EU aid pays for itself in this way (Carreras et al., 2016). 
Another econometric study estimated that, for each British 
pound spent on aid, the UK exports 22 pence worth 
of goods and services (Mendez-Parra, M. and te Velde, 
2016).1 This translates into around 12,000 jobs in the UK. 
Notably, these effects are generated without tying British 
aid to the interest of exporters, as the OECD recommends 
(OECD, 2014). 
Aid for Trade in the context of a new UK trade 
policy
AfT will become even more important in the context 
of a new UK trade policy for two reasons. First, the UK 
will be able to reduce tariffs further than the EU,2 which 
would imply a further reduction in the current value 
of preferences to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
and other preference-dependent countries such as non-
LDC African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.3 
Additional UK AfT would be required to compensate the 
most vulnerable countries. 
Second, if the UK negotiates new trade and investment 
agreements, it can use AfT as a complement to stimulate 
two-way trade and investment and help countries 
implement these new agreements. Risks here include AfT 
being diverted from the poorest countries and being used 
as a bargaining chip (Devex, 2016). The first risk calls 
for an increase in the overall volume of AfT (which is a 
highly targeted and effective way of using aid), whereas the 
second calls for an increase in non-aid financial transfers. 
Both are justified in the interests of UK and developing 
country objectives. 
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Notes
1 Calculations are available upon request. 
2 See the essay by te Velde in this series.
3 See the essays by Stevens and Kennan and by Kennan in this series.
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15. Options for UK preferential 
trade relations amid shifting 
contexts
Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
Abstract 
This essay explores some possibilities for the UK’s preferential trade relations with a range of developing 
countries outside of the EU customs union. The possibilities take into account the shifting trade and 
development landscape – including new opportunities, challenges and players – as well as the role of 
international commerce in achieving the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. 
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Introduction
Trade policy is centre of attention in the UK following the 
vote to leave the EU in late June. Under most conceivable 
Brexit models, the UK and the EU would each need 
to decide how to address obligations under the EU’s 
existing preferential trade arrangements, many of which 
involve a variety of deals with a wide range of developing 
economies.1 This raises a veritable deluge of questions. 
From the UK’s perspective, all kinds of possibilities can 
be considered for all manner of different partners. A key 
challenge will be seizing opportunities to mutually improve 
such relations. 
Potential options for the UK 
The EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
includes the Everything But Arms (EBA) non-reciprocal 
arrangement granting duty-free, quota-free (DFQF) access 
to all products from Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 
except arms and ammunitions. For some of the world’s 
poorest nations, these preferences can be critical to 
improving international competitiveness and thus boosting 
incomes at home. The UN’s Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) have identified DFQF market access for 
LDCs as a systemic means of achieving their vision.  
The UK, which accounted for around 4% of 
merchandise exports from LDCs over the past five years 
(Jones, 2016), could maintain and improve its EBA 
preferences once outside the EU. Assuming it exits the 
customs union – which requires members to impose 
a common external tariff – it could consider strategic 
changes to the EU rules of origin that determine how much 
of an imported product must be sourced from a country 
in order for it to receive the relevant preferences. For 
example, the UK could follow the Canadian model2 and 
implement full cumulation for preferential rules of origin 
for LDCs (Arcand, 2016), thus allowing these countries 
to use a wide range of inputs from other developing 
economies.3 Based on experiences of similar changes, this 
could help stimulate exports among LDCs or regional 
groups (De Melo and Portugal Perez, 2016). It should be 
noted that some poorer nations that are not LDCs also 
benefit from non-reciprocal tariff reductions or removals 
through other aspects of the EU GSP. This includes Sri 
Lanka, which has sent 11% of its goods exports to the UK 
over the past five years. 
The EU also grants reciprocal tariff preferences to 
certain developing countries through free trade agreements 
(FTAs) or other preferential arrangements. Some 25% 
of exports from Belize destined for the UK over the past 
five years, for example, have benefited from arrangements 
under the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
with the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) group. 
One option for the UK to shape trade relations with 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) economies in 
particular would be to simply assume its share of liabilities 
and reaffirm its participation in the EU EPAs currently 
in place with 49 of these countries. However, with the 
exception of CARIFORUM, these deals have not ventured 
beyond goods trade, and there is uncertainty over talks 
further down the line on services, investment, competition, 
data flows and other sustainability and trade-related 
rules. It is now a well-versed reality that trade policy 
and accompanying capacity-building should concern 
themselves with much more than just tariffs in order to 
advance sustainable development. Moreover, some EPAs 
also reflect regional configurations that no longer exist or 
have transformed.  
The UK could alternatively forge arrangements with 
ACP countries that address new trade contexts and support 
regional integration efforts. For example, 26 southern and 
eastern African states have signed a Tripartite Free Trade 
Agreement (TFTA) aiming at tariff liberalisation, trade 
facilitation and disciplines on non-tariff barriers, among 
other areas. While there are hurdles to implementation, 
the participants have envisaged a second phase of talks 
on services, competition policy and intellectual property 
rights. The TFTA is also seen as a building block for 
the creation of a pan-African Continental Free Trade 
Area (CFTA) for goods and services. The UK could act 
simultaneously as an external catalyser of this regional 
integration whilst also using the CFTA as a reference for 
further integration with African economies.
Elsewhere, the UK is already an observer country to 
the Pacific Alliance between Chile,4 Colombia, Peru5 and 
Mexico6 (Villareal, 2016), which is moving progressively 
towards the free movement of goods, services, resources 
and people and creating more sophisticated markets 
in the process. Also on the horizon is the signed Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), involving 12 nations ranging in 
economic might from the US and Japan to Vietnam, and 
covering a host of disciplines. Could the UK eventually 
consider using such new initiatives as integration 
platforms? 
Bridging approaches (Rollo and Winters, 2016) to 
maintain current bilateral arrangements with developing 
and emerging economies secured through EU FTAs 
could also be pursued with countries such as Korea. 
Long-term strategies could then be considered for more 
formalised bilateral and regional trade integration with 
other important players across the globe – some of which 
are in various stages of talks with the EU – ranging from 
Mercosur7 countries to Indonesia,8 India9 and China.10 
Conclusion 
The landscape of global trade has shifted significantly in 
the past two decades (E15Initiative, 2016). Trade policies 
need to adapt to keep up with new opportunities, players 
and realities –  to look to the future and not to the past. 
The UK has experience as a bilateral donor in capacity-
building to make trade work for sustainable development. 
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Building on this could form a key pillar of relations with 
poorer economies and of enhancing shared prosperity. 
The UK should remain open to multifaceted possibilities 
for engagement, reflecting partner capabilities, needs 
and potential. It is in a good position not only to benefit 
from staying engaged on trade with a full spectrum of 
developing economies, but also to advance sustainable 
development by so doing (Anderson et al., 2016). 
Notes
1 See the European Commission’s map of Free Trade Agreements at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/june/
tradoc_149622.pdf .
2 See http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Presentation/aldc2015_05-agenda5_wto_en.pdf
3 See http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/trade-commerce/tariff-tarif/ldct-tpmd-eng.html
4 The EU and Chile concluded an Association Agreement in 2002, which included a comprehensive FTA that entered 
into force in February 2003 (see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/chile/).
5 In June 2012, the EU signed a comprehensive Trade Agreement with Colombia and Peru. The agreement has 
provisionally applied with Peru since 1 March 2013 and with Colombia since 1 August 2013 (see http://ec.europa.eu/
trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/andean-community). 
6 The EU and Mexico are in the process of modernising an FTA that first entered into force in October 2000 (see http://
ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/mexico). 
7 Negotiations between the EU and Mercosur for a trade agreement launched in May 2010 (see http://ec.europa.eu/
trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/mercosur/).
8 Negotiations for an EU-Indonesia FTA were launched in July 2016 (see European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/
trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/indonesia/). 
9 Negotiations for an EU-India FTA were launched in 2007 (see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/
countries/india/). 
10 The EU and China launched negotiations on an investment agreement in November 2013 (see http://ec.europa.eu/
trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/). 
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16. Post-Brexit UK trade policy 
for international development: 
issues and way forward
Mohammad Razzaque and Brendan Vickers, Commonwealth Secretariat
Abstract
The UK is an important trade partner for many African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, so it is imperative 
that Brexit does not result in trade disruptions or unfavourable outcomes for these countries. This essay 
offers some guidelines for shaping future trade arrangements. The UK should start regular consultations now 
to ensure the trade interests of the world’s poorest countries are secured and advanced.  
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Introduction
The prospect of the UK leaving the EU and formulating 
its own trade policy raises important concerns about the 
implications for future trading arrangements with the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, especially 
the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) within this group. 
This essay offers some broad guidelines for making the 
new UK trade policy a genuinely development-friendly one. 
The UK is an important trade partner for many ACP 
states. Various capacity constraints mean these countries 
have not been able to grow their exports substantially. 
Nevertheless, sub-Saharan African countries almost 
doubled their merchandise exports to the UK over the 
period 2000–2014 from $8 billion to about $16 billion, 
while exports by LDCs (including non-ACP LDCs) grew 
roughly fivefold over the same period (from $1.6 billion 
to about $8 billion). Although information on bilateral 
services trade is not readily available, it is clear that the UK 
has also been one of the most important drivers of services 
exports for many tourism-dependent ACP countries. 
Remittances from the UK are also quite high for several 
ACP countries.
Shaping the UK’s future trade arrangements
Given the importance of the UK market for many ACP 
and LDC exporters, it is imperative that Brexit does not 
result in trade disruptions or unfavourable outcomes for 
these countries. There are various possibilities for framing 
and shaping the UK’s future trading arrangements with the 
ACP countries.
For the LDCs, perhaps the best option would be for the 
UK to devise its own Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) that builds upon and improves current arrangements 
for the world’s poorest countries. Under the EU’s 
Everything But-Arms (EBA) scheme, the EU (including 
the UK) provides duty-free, quota-free market access for 
all goods (except arms and ammunition) originating in 
LDCs. Post-Brexit, the UK Government should at least 
maintain this level of market access for LDCs. However, 
it can go even further by offering more favourable terms. 
Improvements can be made in at least two areas.  
First, the rules of origin requirements for meeting the 
eligibility criteria for EU trade preferences are in many 
cases quite stringent and complex. The UK should consider 
using simpler origin determination criteria. The rules of 
origin provisions offered by Australia and Canada, for 
example, whereby recipient countries are required to add 
25% local value before being able to access preferential 
tariff margins, are widely considered to be much better 
practices. It may be possible to allow for further relaxation 
of value addition requirements by considering regional 
cumulation of origin (that is, allowing LDCs to source raw 
materials from other LDCs and ACP countries). 
Second, the UK’s offer of trade preferences should 
be extended to services, in line with the agreed LDC 
Services Waiver under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). There is an opportunity here to set an example by 
offering preferences in services that will be commercially 
meaningful to LDCs. Of course, defining such a preference 
regime in services is challenging. But this is an area where 
gains for LDCs could be quite substantial.  
Turning to the ACP countries, future arrangements 
might be quite complex. Whereas EBA-type unilateral 
trade preferences for LDCs (including the 40 ACP LDCs) 
are likely to be relatively straightforward, given exceptions 
related to the WTO’s provisions for applying the most-
favoured nation (MFN) principle, similar provisions 
for other ACP countries will require non-reciprocal 
trade agreements. Since the EU’s Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) confer duty-free, quota-free access to 
the EU for all signatories, post-Brexit UK policies will need 
to provide equivalent market access for non-LDC ACP 
countries to avoid any trade disruptions. 
One key issue is whether the UK can install replica 
EPAs for ACP countries that have already signed deals 
with the EU. While the existing EPAs could provide a 
framework, this would reopen negotiations on many 
(possibly contentious) issues. As the UK would not be in 
the same powerful bargaining position as the EU, this could 
prolong the process for years. In addition, the question of 
why LDCs should offer reciprocal treatment when they can 
access EBA preferences – something never fully addressed 
in the EPA negotiations – could add to the complexity. 
There is also a view that, rather than strengthening regional 
integration in Africa, the EPAs have actually fragmented 
the existing regional economic communities (RECs) by 
establishing five different reciprocal trading regimes with 
Europe. The UK will need to consider whether replication 
of EPAs is possible and should be pursued.
To avoid any immediate adverse outcomes, one way 
forward for the UK would be to request WTO waivers 
for its ACP partners, allowing it to offer unilateral trade 
preferences. There are precedents for such arrangements, 
including the African Growth and Opportunity Act for 
the US and the Caribbean Basin Initiative. This option 
could avoid having to enter into difficult negotiations with 
ACP countries at this stage, while ensuring continuity of 
preferential treatment for them. 
In the medium to longer term, the UK could consider 
negotiating development-friendly, WTO-compatible trade 
agreements with ACP regions. Under the African Union’s 
formal integration plan, member states aim to launch 
an African Customs Union by 2019. While this is an 
extremely ambitious target with many challenges, such an 
arrangement could provide an opportunity for post-Brexit 
UK and Africa to negotiate a single free trade agreement 
that reinforces African continental integration.
Finally, UK policy-makers should reassure LDCs and 
ACP countries that their market access to the UK after the 
two years (or more) of withdrawal negotiations from the 
EU will be just as favourable as existing arrangements. 
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Given Brexit-related uncertainties, such reassurances of 
trade continuity are imperative for investment decisions and 
future planning. There will be many competing demands on 
its post-Brexit negotiating capacity, so the UK should start 
regular consultations now to ensure the trade interests of 
the world’s poorest countries are secured and advanced. It 
will also be important to ensure that trade-related standards, 
such as sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures and technical 
barriers to trade, do not unnecessarily restrict trade.
Conclusion 
The UK’s commitment to promoting trade-led 
development has been laudable. It has consistently 
recognised the challenges facing, and championed the 
special needs of, country groups such as the LDCs, 
sub-Saharan Africa and the small states. It is also one of 
the few high-income countries that meets the UN target 
of providing 0.7% of gross national income as overseas 
development assistance. It is in this spirit that, with its 
newfound trade policy sovereignty, the UK should seek 
improvements over the currently existing trade preferences 
for ACP states and LDCs.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily represent those of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat.
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17. Options for the UK’s offer 
to developing countries on 
international trade:  
a perspective from Africa
David Luke and Jamie MacLeod, UN Economic Commission for Africa
Abstract
Africa, as a historically linked, rapidly developing and continually important trading partner for the UK, should 
be a priority for the UK’s new post-Brexit trading arrangements. This essay argues that the new UK trade 
policy towards the continent should reinforce Africa’s regional integration initiatives; should be pro-poor and 
pro-development; and should ensure continuity and certainty for Africa’s exports.
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Introduction
Beyond the headlines in reaction to the vote to leave the 
EU – which have dominated both the UK and world 
media alike – are the emerging nuances of Brexit. Most 
importantly, these include development-friendly options for 
the UK’s post-Brexit trading arrangements with Africa. From 
an African perspective, we highlight, the three principles that 
should underline the UK’s trading engagements with the 
continent: support for Africa’s regional integration priorities, 
pro-poor and pro-development trade arrangements, and 
market access continuity. 
Anglo–African Trade
When the UK joined the European Economic Community 
(EEC) 43 years ago, it transferred all authority for its 
trading arrangements to the EEC. In 2014, the UK’s $1.1 
trillion in trade was channelled through these clear and 
predictable legal and institutional frameworks.  
For Africa, this included the Cotonou Agreement, which 
expanded preferential access to the EU market while setting 
up the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) through 
which Africa is poised to gradually open up 75-80% of its 
own market to the EU.
Once outside the EU, the UK must design and build its own 
replacement trade policy for Africa, drawing lessons (where 
applicable) from the EPA experiences, recognising Africa’s 
policy priorities, being an ally to Africa at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and ensuring continuity and certainty 
for African businesses and countries reliant on the UK market. 
Supporting Africa’s regional integration priorities
The UK must consider foremost a continental approach to a 
comprehensive trade agreement with all 54 African countries. 
This would align with Africa’s plans for continental regional 
integration as proposed by the African Union’s Agenda 2063, 
in particular the Continental Free Trade Area (currently 
under negotiation) and an eventual Continental Customs 
Union. Complementary to this would be the scaling-up of 
the UK’s investment in support of Africa’s integration efforts. 
Doing so will help realise the development of Africa’s intra-
regional value chains and markets for industrialisation. 
A single continental approach would also reduce the 
multiplicity of new arrangements facing UK negotiators, easing 
the post-Brexit negotiating burden. The US has proposed 
such an approach as the successor arrangement to its Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act, which is scheduled to be phased 
out after 2025.
Pro-poor, pro-development
A continent-wide trade agreement with Africa should 
incorporate limited reciprocity, immediate access to the 
UK market, flexible rules of origin that allow for cross-
cumulation and phased-in access to the African market. 
Indeed, these are core elements of the EPAs that would likely 
form the basis for discussions.
But the UK should aspire to a truly development-oriented 
trade agreement that includes references to the environment 
and climate change, and in particular green technology 
transfer; that removes subsidies that unfairly disadvantage 
African agriculture, fostering a rural poverty trap; and that 
creates partnerships in services to help African countries 
learn from the UK’s strengths.
The UK should also address EU technical barriers to 
trade, which restrict the UK market for products in which 
Africa has a comparative advantage, such as tropical fruits 
and vegetables, fish products and bovine meats. The Citrus 
Growers’ Association of Southern Africa has suggested 
that revised UK plant health regulations on citrus imports 
could be easier to comply with than present EU regulations1. 
Similar improvements could be arranged for fish and beef, 
of which African exports to the EU have fallen following 
compulsory and expensive regulations. An example is 
provided by the regulations to prevent bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE), which are applied to African countries 
in which BSE has never been diagnosed. In realising these 
advantages, the UK could continue to recognise EU standards 
so as not to duplicate regulations where unnecessary.  
Beyond trade agreements, the UK should prove itself an 
ally to Africa at the WTO, championing African priorities 
such as special and differential treatment and eliminating 
agriculture subsidies.
Market access continuity
Transitional trading arrangements will be required while 
any continental agreement is determined. The UK will 
have many negotiating priorities during Brexit, and these 
transitional arrangements must bridge the gap to a more 
comprehensive and progressive trade agreement, which is 
likely to take more time.
The preferable option is for the UK to incorporate 
transitional arrangements into its EU leaving conditions 
such that it temporarily continues to participate in EU–
Africa trade arrangements. Article 50 does not define the 
scope and content of the withdrawal arrangements, so it is 
feasible that the UK could negotiate to retain transitional 
membership of certain agreements. This would provide legal 
certainty and assurance for African exporters and investors, 
and continuity for African businesses.
Conclusion
The UK faces a considerable range of negotiating priorities. 
Africa, as a rapidly developing and historically linked trading 
partner, should not be overlooked in these. In crafting its 
trade policy approach to Africa, the UK must reinforce the 
continent’s regional integration initiatives; it must ensure 
market access continuity and certainty; and it should base its 
agreements on a pro-poor and pro-development principle. 
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1. http://www.fruitnet.com/eurofruit/article/169211/rsa-citrus-trade-sees-brexit-opportunities
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18. Why trade with Asia is vital to 
the UK economy
Ganeshan Wignaraja, Asian Development Bank
Abstract
Trade between the UK and Asia presents an opportunity for shared economic prosperity in a fragile world 
economy. This essay discusses how a coherent and focused post-Brexit UK trade policy with an emphasis on 
Asia will help realise these opportunities. It also mentions key risks to trade outcomes.
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Introduction 
The UK is rethinking its approach to trade with developing 
countries in Asia following the vote to leave the EU. This 
essay discusses Asia–UK trade relations, opportunities, 
policy priorities and risks. 
Trade between the UK and developing Asia
The UK is not a major trading partner for developing 
Asia. Exports to the UK from developing Asia made up 
only 0.6% of developing Asia’s gross domestic product 
annually from 2013 to 2015, and imports from the UK 
to developing Asia made up just 0.3%.1 Only a few 
economies – Hong Kong, China, Viet Nam, Cambodia, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka – have strong trade ties with the 
UK. With these exceptions, developing Asia is therefore 
relatively insulated from any potential economic shock 
from Brexit transmitted through a fall in trade. This also 
means that trade between developing Asia and the UK 
seems to be below potential. Developing Asia is a bright 
spot in a fragile world economy, with growth of about 6% 
projected in the next two years and a growing consumer-
oriented middle class estimated to number over 2 billion 
by 2030.2 In the future, China, India and the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could become 
important trading partners for the UK.
Notable trade complementarity exists with the UK. 
Sophisticated global value chains (GVCs) centred on east 
Asia have driven exports of labour-intensive and medium-
technology manufacturing,3 in return for imports of services 
and high-end manufacturing from the UK. GVCs also offer 
opportunities for two-way foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in manufacturing and energy and transport infrastructure. 
More trade and FDI with developing Asia would stimulate 
key sectors in the UK, including financial and professional 
services, green technology and services, creative services (e.g. 
music, literature and film) and manufacturing (agri-food, 
automotives, aerospace, chemicals and pharmaceuticals). 
Trade barriers have held back the expansion of trade 
between developing Asia and the UK. In 2014, average 
tariffs on all goods fell to historic lows of 8.7% in 
developing Asia and 5.3% in the EU, but tariff peaks 
for sensitive sectors like agriculture remain quite high.4 
In addition, rising non-tariff measures (NTMs) and 
restrictions on the services trade have followed concerns 
over jobs since the global financial crisis.  
Priorities for fostering trade
Many uncertainties prevail over the timing of the UK 
triggering Article 50 of the EU Treaty and the shape of a 
new trade deal between the UK and the EU. Accordingly, 
trade between the UK and developing Asia will be 
governed by EU trade policy for the foreseeable future, 
including the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
for developing countries, a solitary EU–Korea free trade 
agreement (FTA) and most-favoured nation treatment 
under the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, 
an EU-India FTA has been under negotiation since 2007 
and an EU–Japan FTA since 2013. 
Assuming that the UK ends up with an independent 
national trade policy, given the country’s scarce trade 
negotiating capacity, a limited trade policy agenda makes 
sense. The following priorities will help foster trade 
between developing Asia and the UK. 
Forge an FTA with China
China, Asia’s largest economy, is continuing the gradual shift 
in its growth model from relying on exports and investment 
towards domestic consumption and the services sector, so 
as to achieve more balanced and sustainable growth.5 The 
UK would be an attractive FTA partner given its close trade 
complementarity with China based on the UK’s strengths (in 
financial services, green technology and services, and high-
end manufacturing, for example), its close political ties with 
China and its geographical proximity to Europe. 
A UK–China FTA should strive to be comprehensive 
and of a high standard. It should cover rules on goods, 
services, investment, trade facilitation, intellectual property 
and dispute settlement. It should also have a built-in 
agenda for deepening liberalisation over time. Challenging 
issues in China’s business environment may arise during 
negotiations, such as NTMs against imports, industrial 
subsidies for state-owned enterprises and insufficient 
intellectual property enforcement. Likewise, the UK’s strict 
visa rules for business people and tough environmental 
standards may come up. However, China’s 2008 FTA 
with New Zealand and its 2015 FTA with Australia offer 
templates for an FTA with the UK. 
Extending the UK-China FTA negotiations to include 
Hong Kong should be explored, as much of China’s trade 
takes place through it. FTAs with Korea and Japan should 
also be considered, using EU FTAs with these countries as 
templates. 
Engage in plurilateral trade agreements 
Covering trade rules in specific sectors for like-minded 
countries on a voluntary basis, plurilateral trade agreements 
are increasingly being negotiated among WTO members. 
Ongoing negotiations on environmental goods and trade 
in services could be concluded in 2016–2017, while earlier 
plurilateral deals include the Information Technology 
Agreement and the Government Procurement Agreement. 
When feasible, the UK should become a member of 
plurilateral agreements that include middle-income 
southeast Asian economies, such as China and India. 
Consider creating a GSP scheme for Least Developed 
Countries
The UK’s GSP could emulate the EU’s Everything But Arms 
arrangement and allow Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
duty-free, quota-free access to the UK for all their goods 
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(except arms and ammunition). Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Nepal, Myanmar and Timor-Leste are the likely 
Asian LDC beneficiaries. 
Use the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism to 
resolve trade quarrels, enforce trade rules and 
facilitate smooth trade flows with developing Asia 
The UK should re-establish its credentials in the WTO and 
invest in independent international trade law capabilities to 
use the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism effectively. 
Although it is a founding WTO member, the UK is 
presently represented by the EU and included in EU dispute 
settlement cases. 
There are risks that trade outcomes will be dampened.6 
Trade agreements typically take longer to negotiate than 
expected, particularly those involving services and new 
trade issues. China’s FTA with New Zealand took three 
years; the FTA with Australia took a decade. Furthermore, 
rising anti-globalisation sentiments mean such agreements 
may face difficulties in getting legislative ratification and 
exhibit more limited depth than expected. Providing 
adjustment assistance to losing sectors, retraining for 
workers and ensuring social safety nets can be useful to 
maintain public support for trade liberalisation. Finally, as 
the use of FTA preferences may be less than optimal, it is 
vital to strengthen trade promotion services and business 
support for small and medium enterprises. 
Conclusion
A stronger focus on Asia in the UK’s independent trade 
policy is vital for opening trade and for mutual economic 
prosperity. To ensure success, the policy should focus 
on a limited agenda, and do it well. This should involve 
an FTA with China and the exploration of FTAs with 
Japan and Korea, plurilateral trade agreements, a GSP 
scheme for LDCs and using the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism. Mitigating key risks relating to sectoral 
adjustment, depth of FTAs and sub-optimal use of FTA 
preferences will likely enhance the effectiveness of the UK’s 
independent trade policy. 
The views expressed here are solely those of the author and 
should not be attributed to the Asian Development Bank.
Notes
1. Estimated from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and the IMF World Economic Outlook. 
2. See ADB (2016) for short-term GDP forecasts for Asia and ADB and ADBI (2014) for economic scenarios to 2030. 
3. See Wignaraja (2016 eds) for detailed of patterns and drivers of GVCs and production networks in East Asia. 
4. Estimated from the World Trade Organization Tariff Profile and Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal. 
5. Wignaraja (2012) examines the role of trade policy in supporting China’s rise in global trade and emerging  policy 
challenges. ADB and ADBI (2014) assess the future economic implications of the structural transformation in China 
for Asia and the global economy. 
6. See Kawai and Wignaraja (2014) for an assessment of these risks in the context of Asian FTAs. 
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19. Brexit and Latin America
Max Mendez-Parra, Overseas Development Institute
Abstract
The effect of Brexit on trade with Latin America will be small, but the potential benefits of stronger links 
between the UK and the region are large for both. This essay argues that while a free trade agreement with 
Brazil is difficult to foresee, quick positive results could be realised with other countries in the region. 
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Introduction
Although it has global significance, Brexit is seen in Latin 
America as a distant and curious event. In fact, Latin 
America sees the UK as a politically and economically 
distant partner. This essay analyses the effects of Brexit in 
the region and discusses the potential opportunities for 
further engagement. In particular, it assesses the potential for 
a free trade agreement (FTA) between the UK and Brazil.  
How will Brexit affect Latin America?
The effect of Brexit on trade between the UK and Latin 
America is expected to be minimal. Table 1 presents the 
trade between the UK and Latin America in 2015. On 
average, the UK accounts for less than 1% of total Latin 
American exports, and Latin America absorbs just 1.93% 
of the UK’s total exports. Exports of services to Latin 
America represent just 1.4% of total exports, and imports 
of services from Latin America represent 1.3% of total UK 
imports.1 Consequently, any change in UK trade policy 
towards Latin American countries will have minimal 
effects on these countries. At the same time, the effects on 
the UK of the reversion to most-favoured nation (MFN) 
status (as the EU’s FTAs with many of these countries will 
not apply to the UK after Brexit) will be limited to just 
1% of UK exports. Exports to the Common Market of the 
South (Mercosur) will not be affected.2  
For many Latin American countries, it has been a long 
time since the UK represented their main trade partner 
or their main source of foreign direct investment. For 
example, in 1962, the UK captured 17% of Argentina’s 
exports.3 The decline in the relationship between the 
UK and Latin America is also political in nature. David 
Cameron visited Asia 23 times between 2010 and 2014, 
and Latin America only twice over the same period.4 
Brexit may affect current FTA negotiations between the 
EU and Latin American countries, however. Once the UK 
leaves the EU, its agricultural protectionist lobby will gain 
weight in decision-making. This will further complicate 
the EU–Mercosur FTA, as well as encouraging the EU to 
take a more rigid position in World Trade Organization 
negotiations on agriculture, which is a key issue for Latin 
America. 
More economic engagement with Latin 
America: challenges and opportunities
There is major interest (and impatience)5 among many 
supporters of Brexit in projecting the UK beyond Europe. 
Among Latin American countries, Brazil has been targeted 
as a major future signatory of an FTA with the UK. The 
UK has a lot to gain from such an FTA – its exports attract 
an average tariff of almost 12% in Brazil. 
However, a potential FTA with Brazil presents a series 
of issues. The first complication is associated with the fact 
that Brazil is part of the Mercosur customs union, with 
Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. The UK will 
need to negotiate the agreement with the entire group, not 
just Brazil. Although the current government in Argentina 
may be willing to engage in an enhanced economic 
relationship, an FTA with the UK alone will be not very 
easy to present to the Argentine people, with the memory 
of the Falklands War still present. Although the failures 
of Mercosur are plain to see to its members, there is no 
indication at present that a ‘Braxit’ is on the horizon that 
might help circumvent this issue. 
Mercosur is extremely protectionist. In addition to 
high tariffs, Brazil (along with Argentina) is among the 
countries that apply the highest number of discriminatory 
measures in the G20 (Evenett and Fritz, 2015). Moreover, 
no developed country has signed an FTA with Brazil. The 
FTA of the Americas (which included the US and Canada) 
capsized in 2005 without major concern from Brazil, 
while the EU–Mercosur FTA has been under negotiation 
since 1999. Although the EU is resistant to opening up 
markets in agricultural products, Brazil (again, along with 
Argentina) has a similar resistance to non-agricultural 
products. FTAs negotiated by Mercosur tend to be 
extremely shallow and limited in scope. The Mercosur–
India FTA, for example, excludes key agricultural and 
industrial products. 
The UK has not expressed any interest in the rest of 
Latin America. Interestingly, however, it is likely that it 
will find some low-hanging fruit if it looks to expand its 
relationship with the rest of the continent. After Brexit, the 
UK will find very little resistance from Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru and Central American countries to renewing 
coverage of their trade through an FTA. In fact, the EU is 
currently in the process of ‘modernising’ and amplifying 
existing FTAs with Chile and Mexico. Renegotiating these 
agreements will take some time,6 and the UK could reap 
faster results by engaging with these countries.  
Conclusion
Brexit will have minimal effects on Latin America. In 
turn, the non-application of current FTAs between Latin 
American and the EU will have limited effects on the UK. 
However, replacements for these agreements with some 
countries are likely to be easy and quick to negotiate, and 
the UK could obtain quick results by engaging with these 
countries.  
Negotiating an FTA with Brazil in the short to medium 
term, however, would be very unlikely. It is politically 
complicated and not a priority for Brazil. And although it 
would be extremely beneficial for Mercosur to open up, it 
is unlikely that this will happen in the near future. 
The UK will need to find smarter ways of becoming 
a protagonist in Latin America. With millions of the 
region’s population still in poverty, more Aid for Trade, for 
example, may be a valuable tactic.  Over time, such tactics 
will open up the region to the UK. 
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Table 1: UK–Latin America trade in 2015
Exports of Latin American countries to the UK
Value 
($ millions)
Share in total exports (%) EU tariffs  
(weighted by Latin 
American exports to UK)
EU tariffs  
(weighted by Latin 
American total exports)*
Mercosur 3,783 1.08 2.1 2.1
Brazil 2,883 1.53 2.4 1.9
Argentina 719 1.29 1.4 2.9
Rest of Mercosur 180 0.17 0.9 1.7
Mexico 1,935 0.51 3.2 2.7
Colombia 1,090 1.99 0.2 1.0
Chile 673 1.06 3.6 1.7
Peru 478 1.44 5.0 0.8
Costa Rica 177 1.85 2.9 3.2
Rest of Latin American 637 1.00 2.0 3.6
Total 
(Cuba not included)
8,775 0.92 2.4 2.1
Exports of the UK to Latin American countries
Value ($ millions) Share in total exports (%) Partner tariffs  
(weighted by UK bilateral 
exports)
Partner tariffs  
(weighted by UK total 
exports)
Mercosur 4,321 0.96 8.2 11.9
Brazil 3,198 0.71 8.4 11.9
Argentina 437 0.10 8.7 11.9
Venezuela 318 0.07 8.5 11.9
Rest of Mercosur 367 0.08 5.6 11.9
Mexico 1,948 0.43 3.3 6.1
Chile 680 0.15 5.8 5.6
Colombia 547 0.12 3.8 7.1
Peru 279 0.06 2.7 2.4
Rest of Latin America 942 0.21 3.8 6.3
Total 8,719 1.93 6.0 8.9
Notes: * Non-ad valorem tariffs on many agricultural products in the EU are not transformed into ad valorem equivalents. Consequently, the 
effective average applied tariffs to many Latin American countries will be substantially higher. 
Trade data for Colombia, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua and Uruguay are for 2014. Data for Venezuela are for 2013. 
Matching between trade and tariffs is not perfect and figures underestimate the true weighted average.
Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay and Peru are Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)+ beneficiaries. Colombia, 
Honduras and Nicaragua are GSP (standard) beneficiaries. The rest of the partners attract MFN tariffs in the EU.
Countries marked in bold have a FTA with the EU. In addition, the EU has FTAs with Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador and Panama. 
Source: UN Comtrade and TRAINS.
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Notes
1 Author’s calculations based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) database. 
2 The full members of Mercosur are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
3 Author’s calculations based on UN Comtrade. 
4 https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/mar/11/david-camerons-trips-overseas-where-has-he-visited.
5 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e87614da-533a-11e6-befd-2fc0c26b3c60.html#axzz4G1GDBrjV.  
6 Even the EU–Chile FTA took around six years to be negotiated. 
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